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RECENT DECISIONS
TORTS-IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE-PARENTAL NEGLIGENCE SHORT OF
SUPERSEDING NEGLIGENCE WILL NOT BE IMPUTED TO A CHILD TO
RELIEVE LANDLORD OF LIABILITY FOR LEAD POISONING- Caroline

v. Reicher.'

For many years injured children were denied compensation
in Maryland by the rule that "if the child be so young as not to
be able to take care of itself, then parental neglect, resulting in
injury, may be imputed to the child." 2 Condemned by certain
authorities as barbarous, 3 this doctrine of imputed contributory
negligence between parent and child was abrogated in 1956 by the
Maryland General Assembly:

In all actions to recover damages, for death, or injury to the
person or property of an infant, by or on behalf of an infant,

the negligence of the parent or other custodian of the infant
shall not be imputed to the infant from the fact of such
parenthood or custodianship.'
1. 269 Md. 125, 304 A.2d 831 (1973).
2. Graham v. Western Maryland Dairy, 198 Md. 210, 214, 81 A.2d 457, 459 (1951),
quoting from York Ice Mach. Corp. v. Sachs, 167 Md. 113, 123, 173 A. 240, 245 (1934). In
Graham, a three year old child, by his father and next friend, unsuccessfully sued a dairy
company for personal injuries incurred when a dairy truck collided with the child while
he was riding his tricycle in an alley. The mother allowed her child to play in the alley,
knew he was there at the time of the accident, and also knew trucks frequented the alley.
Because legally a parent's negligence could be imputed to the child, the Court of Appeals
held that upon these facts the trial judge properly instructed the jury to consider whether
the mother was guilty of contributory negligence which would defeat the child's claim.
3. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, TORTS 490 (4th ed. 1971): "This barbarous rule ... denied
to the innocent victim of the negligence of two parties any recovery against either and
visited the sins of the fathers upon the children."
4. MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, § 2 (1969)(emphasis added). Maryland was one of the last
states in the country to reject the imputed parental negligence doctrine. See Hill,
Imputing Parental Negligence to Bar Recovery by an Infant, 15 MD.L. REv. 248 (1955),
for a general discussion of the Maryland cases upholding the doctrine and the trend in
other jurisdictions to overrule it. The author concluded that it was the duty of the Maryland legislature to bar the doctrine's use. Less than a year later the legislature enacted
the ban. California, in Zarzana v. Neve Drug Co., 180 Cal. 32, 179 P. 203 (1919), overruled
the imputed negligence doctrine thirty-seven years before the enactment of the Maryland
statute. For an example of another state's statute see N.Y. DOM. EL. LAW § 73 (McKinney
1964) which states: "In an action brought by an infant to recover damages for personal
injury, the contributory negligence of the infant's parent or other custodian shall not be
imputed to the infant." Query whether the Maryland statute differs substantively from
the New York statute because of the language "from the fact of such parenthood or
custodianship" in the Maryland enactment. See note 5 infra.
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Despite this statute, subsequent Maryland case law indicates
that parental negligence which constitutes an independent and
superseding cause of the child's injuries will act to discharge the
passive negligent act of another.5 Thus, courts must determine
whether the actions of the parents constitute an independent and
superseding cause of the injury to the child. Often, courts must
make this determination in the context of a ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence. Recently the Maryland Court of Appeals
in Caroline v. Reicher seemed in this context to change the law
in Maryland by sub silentio raising the standard for the sufficiency of the evidence of superseding negligence.
In June of 1968, Brenda Caroline rented an apartment in
Baltimore City from Reicher Enterprises, Inc., for herself and her
three children. Prior to the rental, she noticed that the paint and
wallpaper were chipped, cracked, and peeling. Although a corporate officer orally promised to paint and to repair the apartment
after the family moved in, he did nothing. In the following
months, Ms. Caroline's one-year-old daughter Dawn became listless, lost her appetite and cried for long periods of time. When
this behavior persisted into the summer of 1969 Ms. Caroline took
Dawn to a hospital. Subsequent diagnosis revealed that Dawn
was the victim of lead poisoning which left her permanently
blind, retarded, and neurologically handicapped.
The child and her mother sued the landlord corporation and
its individual officers.7 During the trial, Ms. Caroline testified
5. See, e.g., Katz v. Holsinger, 264 Md. 307, 286 A.2d 115 (1972); Farley v. Yerman,
231 Md. 444, 190 A.2d 773 (1963). In Katz the landlord argued that the mother's alleged
negligent failure to prevent the infant from going out on the porch, although not imputed
to the infant from the fact of parenthood (see note 4 and accompanying text supra), was
so extraordinary as to constitute a superseding cause of the child's fall from the porch.
The court agreed that the principle behind the argument was valid but stated that the
acts of the mother here were not so unusual as to constitute a superseding cause.
If sufficient evidence of superseding cause is presented, the court might in essence
nullify or circumvent the statute. The negligence of the parent would discharge the third
party's liability and leave the child without a remedy, since in Maryland a child may not
sue his parent or guardian, unless the parent's acts are wanton and malicious. Mahnke v.
Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A.2d 923, 926 (1950), which states:
Ordinarily, the parent is not liable for damage to the child for . . . acts [which]
grow out of and pertain to the relation of parent and child. But . . . [j]ustice
demands that a minor child shall have a right of action against a parent for injuries
resulting from cruel and inhuman treatment or for malicious and wanton wrongs.
The principle was recently recognized in Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 272 A.2d 435
(dictum), cert. denied, 261 Md. 726 (1971) (parent cannot sue minor, unemancipated child
for injuries caused by the child's negligence).
6. 269 Md. 125, 304 A.2d 831 (1973).
7. Originally brought in the Court of Common Pleas for Baltimore City, the case
was removed, at the defendants' request, to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for
a trial by jury.
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that she never left Dawn unsupervised and that she swept away
paint chips daily. Although she recalled having seen paint chips
in Dawn's mouth twice, Ms. Caroline denied knowledge of lead
paint poisoning prior to her child's illness. Dawn's physician gave
uncontraverted testimony that Dawn had probably ingested
paint chips about the size of a nickel or quarter on the average of
two or three times a week, for at least three months and probably
for a year.' At the close of the plaintiff's case, the trial judge
directed verdicts in favor of the individual defendants, but he
denied a similar request by the corporation at the close of all of
the evidence.? After the jury returned a verdict for the defendant
corporation, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for either a
judgment n.o.v. or a new trial.
On appeal the Carolines contended that the trial judge's instruction to the jury,' 0 that "the landlord was not liable if his
negligence was merely 'passive and potential' while the 'moving
and effective cause of the injury' was the superseding negligence
of the mother,"" was error. The Court of Appeals agreed. The
8. The court noted that covert eating of non-food substances, termed "pica", is a
habit of about fifty percent of all children between one and three years of age and that
parental non-observance occurs about ninety percent of the time. 269 Md. at 134-135, 304
A.2d at 836. See also Greengard, Lead Poisoning in Children:Signs, Symptoms, Current
Therapy, ClinicalExpressions, 5 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 269 (1966). Incipient lead poisoning
is difficult to diagnose, because it is often asymptomatic or it is exhibited by vague
symptoms such as constipation and irritability. For example, the doctors in Caroline at
first thought that Dawn's symptoms were caused by jealousy of a younger sister. Yet,
treatment is effective only in the early stages. Id. See also Lin-Fu, LEAD POISONING IN
CHILDREN 7 (U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, Children's Bureau Pub. No.
452, 1967). For a compilation of the medical literature, see Note, Lead Paint Poisoning:
Legal Remedies and Preventive Actions, 6 COLUM. J. LAW & Soc. PROB. 325, 327 (1970).
For a discussion of lead paint poisoning in general and the acts being taken to alleviate
the problem see Appendix infra.
9. The appellate opinion supplies no reason for the respective grant and denial of
directed verdicts. See note 12 infra and accompanying text.
10. Appellant's other arguments for reversal included: the trial judge's refusal to
reinstruct the jury after it raised questions about a city ordinance and negligence law;
prejudice stemming from the judge's advising the jury to consider damages only after
determining liability and from his stating that more than normal medical testimony was
required to establish causation; and the trial court's directed verdict favoring one of the
corporate officers. 269 Md. at 129-30, 304 A.2d at 833. The appellate court discussed only
the latter of these arguments. See note 12 infra.
11. Id. The judge's instructions, in pertinent part, were:
[Ilf
you find the injury might not have happened to the infant plaintiff, but for
an antecedent act of the defendant, the defendant is not liable if his negligence was
merely passive and potential, when the negligence of another, such as the mother,
isthe moving and effective cause of the injury . . ..
[Wihat that means in essence is that if the Defendant is clearly negligent, and
the mother was somewhat negligent, too, of course, you could not bar the child's
recovery.
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evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that Ms.
Caroline's conduct constituted independent and superseding negligence and, therefore, did not justify an instruction. In remanding the case for a new trial, the court acknowledged that to succeed on remand the Carolines would still bear the burden of showing that Dawn's injuries were proximately caused by lead poisoning and that the poisoning resulted from ingestion of paint chips
negligently left on the premises by the landlord.
The court found no Maryland 11lead paint poisoning cases
on point to support the holding that as a matter of law the facts
did not constitute independent superseding negligence which
woul discharge the landlord from any proven liability. Rather, the
court discussed general landlord tenant cases in which the injured
children of tenants recovered compensatory damages from landlords despite arguments by the landlords that the parents were
negligent. In Farley v. Yerman"4 a four-year-old girl was burned
as she ran by an unscreened gas log which supplemented a furnace and which projected into the living room from a shallow
fireplace. The landlord was aware of the danger and had promised
several times-once in response to a threat by the plaintiffs that
they would move-to buy a screen for the impoverished tenants.
The Court of Appeals, in reversing the lower court's directed verdict in favor of the landlord and in remanding the case for a new
trial, rejected the landlord's argument that the parent's supersed5
ing negligence was the proximate cause of the child's injury.'
You could only bar the child's recovery if the mother's negligence was the
principal thing that brought about this injury.
Now, that would be true even though the Defendant had committed some
violation, if you found that that was not the real cause, that it was really the
mother's, that is the only way you could bar the recovery of this Plaintiff, of the
infant ....
269 Md. at 129-30, 304 A.2d at 833.
12. Because the record submitted by the appellants contained neither a motion for
directed verdict nor the lower court's ruling on the motion as required by Rules 828(b)(1)
and (i)(2) of the Maryland Rules of Procedure, the court permitted the directed verdicts
favoring the individual corporate officers to stand. Lacking the "information 'reasonably
. . . necessary for the determination of the question presented,' " the court exercised its
authority not to rule on appellants' assertion that the motion was erroneously granted.
269 Md. at 136-37, 304 A.2d at 837.
13. See Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1268 (1972) for the sparse collection of other states'
landlord-tenant lead paint cases.
14. 231 Md. 444, 190 A.2d 773 (1963).
15. Caroline, Katz, and Farley cite to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 447 (1965)
which states:
The fact that an intervening act of a third person is negligent in itself or is done
in a negligent manner does not make it a superseding cause of harm to another
which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about, if
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6 the Court of Appeals afSimilarly, in Katz v. Holsinger"
firmed a jury verdict awarding damages to a two-year-old child
who fell through a hole in a porch railing. The landlords knew of
the danger in general, had been specifically warned of the actual
hazard to the infant, and had promised to remedy the defect.
Considering constant vigilance over an active infant to be impossible, the Court of Appeals found that the acts or omissions of the
parents were not so unusual or extraordinary as to be unreasonable or as to constitute a superseding cause. 7
An analysis of Farley and Katz reveals the importance of
Caroline. First, the Court of Appeals in both Farley and Katz
discussed the duty owed by the landlord to the tenant; duty,
however, is not discussed in Caroline. Second, and of paramount
importance, the court in Carolineas a matter of law found insufficient evidence of superseding negligence on the part of the mother
on less persuasive facts than existed in either Farley or Katz.
Thus, the Court of Appeals, at least in lead paint poisoning cases,
appears to be invoking a higher standard of law for facts of superseding negligence to go to the jury.
Concerning the landlord's duty, both Farley and Katz recognize that only if a landlord contracts to repair defects in the
leased premises can the tenant sue for injuries sustained as a
result of the defect, because at common law there existed no
implied covenant to repair leased premises and no warranty of
fitness for occupancy of the premises. In Farley the court found
a contractual obligation for consideration from the landlord's
promise to provide a screen for the gas log in the face of a threat
(a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have realized that
a third person might so act, or
(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the act of the third
person was done would not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third
person had so acted, or
(c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a situation created by the
actor's conduct and the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily
negligent.
The Caroline court construed Farley to hold that, as a matter of law, the rule of superseding negligence was inapplicable, i.e., the facts and the legal inferences therefrom did not
rise to the level of presenting a jury question. 269 Md. at 133 n.3, 304 A.2d at 835 n.3.
The conclusion that Farley as a matter of law held that the facts fell short of superseding
negligence may be warranted by an analysis of the cases cited in Farley and the words as
written. But see the text following note 24 infra.
16. 264 Md. 307, 286 A.2d 115 (1972).
17. Caroline also viewed Katz as stating that as a matter of law the facts were
insufficient to show a superseding cause. It must be recognized, however, that at the trial
in Katz the facts did go to the jury and that on appeal the court merely affirmed the jury's
verdict. See the text following note 24 infra.
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by the tenants that they would move.' 8 In Katz the court found
that the landlords agreed to repair the property not only in the
original lease but also in a subsequent specific promise to repair
the porch. 9
In Caroline,however, the court did not discuss the landlord's
obligation or lack of obligation to repair the chipped and peeling
walls. No statute was in effect at the time prohibiting the use of
lead-based paint in housing units. 2 Therefore, only speculation
concerning any possible obligation can be offered. Perhaps an
obligation arose from the oral promise by one of the corporate
officers prior to Ms. Caroline's rental to repair the apartment.
Perhaps an obligation was created because of the existence of a
latent defect at the time of the lease. On the other hand, the court
perhaps did not consider a contractual obligation to be necessary
in light of judicial notice that lead paint poisoning is lethal to
children. While the appellate court did not discuss the obligation,
it did remand the case. The Carolines to recover would have to
show at the new trial, that the "child's injuries were proximately
caused by lead poisoning and the poisoning was caused by the
ingestion of lead-containing paint chips negligently permitted by
the landlord to be present on its property."'" The appellate court
thereby implied that Ms. Caroline will have to show the landlord
had a duty and had breached the duty. No legal guidelines, however, were given to the trial court.
The importance of Caroline is further indicated by Caroline's
citation of Katz and Farley for the proposition that, as a matter
of law, the evidence was not sufficient to permit the charge of
superseding negligence to go to the jury. 2 Neither case specifically states that the evidence as a matter of law was insufficient
for a jury instruction concerning superseding negligence. Moreover, neither case can procedurally justify such a conclusion. The
court in Farley reversed the trial judge's directed verdict in favor
of the landlord and remanded for a new trial. The court in Katz
18. The Farley court also noted that a Baltimore city ordinance required gas logs to
be maintained safely. 231 Md. at 444, 190 A.2d at 775.
19. See Barnes v. Housing Authority, 231 Md. 147, 189 A.2d 100 (1963) (Because
the landlord did not violate any duty owed to the tenants, the landlord was not liable for
injuries to a child when he fell into a pit on adjoining property.).
20. See Appendix infra.
21. 269 Md. at 136, 304 A.2d at 837 (emphasis added).
22. Only in light of the general language and by implication in the two previous
cases can their holding be so stated. Caroline at one point seemed to strain to draw this
conclusion. 269 Md. at 133 n.3, 304 A.2d at 835 n.3. See notes 15 and 17 supra and the
text following note 24 infra.

1974

IMPUTATION

OF PARENTAL NEGLIGENCE

merely affirmed the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff.2 3
Caroline is in fact the first case to state clearly that as a matter
of law in parent-child relationships certain facts will not justify
jury consideration of possible parental superseding negligence.2
A conclusive argument that Katz and Farley procedurally do
not justify Caroline's interpretation of them would be based on
the assumption that the defendant has the burden of proof to
establish the superseding negligence of the third party, i.e., the
parent. Under this assumption, the affirmation of the jury's verdict in Katz merely implies that the trial judge did not err in
refusing to direct a verdict for the party with the burden of proof,
the defendant landlord. In order for the trial judge to have
granted a directed verdict, the evidence of superseding negligence
would have to have been so overwhelming that reasonable men
would not differ on the question. Similarly, the appellate court's
reversal, in Farley, of the directed verdict in favor of the party
with the burden of proof (with respect to superseding negligence)
implies only that there was not enough evidence of superseding
negligence to take the issue away from the jury, not that as a
matter of law the evidence was insufficient to go to the jury.
There are two reasons why this argument cannot be conclusive. First, it is unclear, as a general rule, whether the defendants
have the burden of proof of establishing superseding negligence.
Superseding negligence may only be one aspect of proximate
cause, in which case the burden of proof would be on the plaintiff.
Neither Farley nor Katz discusses this question. Second, the
court in Farley and in Katz did not analytically separate the
questions of the proof of the defendant's negligence (and specifically the element of causation) from the question of the parents'
negligence. Thus, the reversal of the directed verdict in Farley
and the affirmation on the jury verdict in Katz cannot be directly
linked to the narrow question of the sufficiency of the evidence
of superseding negligence. Notwithstanding these ambiguities, it
is nevertheless clear that neither Farley nor Katz expressly stated
or held that, as a matter of law, there was insufficient evidence
23. See notes 15 and 17 and accompanying text supra. The court in Caroline also
remanded for a new trial. However, it seems clear that the court remanded in order to
allow in new evidence and to determine if Dawn's injuries were proximately caused by
lead poisoning from lead paint negligently left in the leased premises. 269 Md. at 136, 304
A.2d at 837.
24. "Here ... we conclude that, as a matter of law, the evidence did not permit the
granting of the instruction submitting to the jury the question of the effect of any negligence by the mother on the liability of the landlord." 269 Md. at 134, 304 A.2d at 836.
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of superseding negligence to go to the jury. In this regard,
Caroline represents a refinement of the earlier discussions.
Nonetheless, Caroline read Farley and Katz to hold that, as
a matter of law, the facts did not indicate superseding negligence
and that, therefore, the jury could not view the facts. Carolinedid
so on much less persuasive facts. First, in Farley and Katz, the
landlord had knowledge of the respective dangers involved. In
Katz, the landlord was specifically warned that the child might
fall from the porch. In Farley, the landlord was told that an
unprotected log emitting open flames was dangerous to the children. In Caroline, however, the court did not state whether the
landlord was aware of the danger of lead-poisoning from flaking

paint .25
Second, the mothers in the two previous cases took active
precautions against the respective dangers. In Katz, the mother,
realizing the danger, kept a close watch on the child. In Farley,
the mother drew a line around the gas log and instructed the
children not to go inside the line. In addition, both mothers continuously warned the landlord of the dangers. Assuming that 100
percent supervision of children is not possible, both mothers established that they acted with the greatest of care.
In Caroline, however, the mother testified that she was unaware of the danger of lead paint poisoning although she did sweep
the paint chips off the floor daily. Since she did not perceive the
danger she did not, as did the mothers in Farley and Katz, continually remind the landlord to remedy the danger or continually
instruct the children of the danger.
25. At least one court has inferred knowledge of the danger of lead-based paint from
a statute prohibiting the paint's use. Acosta v. Irdank Realty Corp., 38 Misc. 2d 859, 238
N.Y.S. 2d 713, 714 (Sup. Ct. 1963) ("I merely cite this provision of law to show that the
defendant should have known that the paint on the walls of this apartment contained lead
which might be harmful to the occupants of the apartment."). Maryland's lead paint
prohibition was not in effect at the time of the trial in Caroline,however. See note 49 infra
and accompanying text.
Since Caroline is the first lead paint case in Maryland to reach the Court of Appeals,
the court should have indicated the importance of the landlord's knowledge of leadpoisoning and discussed the issue in detail. One can only assume landlords in Maryland
are chargeable with the knowledge that peeling lead paint may injure young tenants. This
is especially true in light of the recent lead paint statute, see note 49, infra, and accompanying text, coupled with the legal principle that violation of a statute or ordinance is
considered evidence of negligence. See, e.g., Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 259-60,
206 A.2d 148, 158 (1965). Cf. Stein v. Overlook Joint Venture, 246 Md. 75, 80, 227 A.2d
226, 230 (1967) (enactment of an ordinance after an accident happens precludes the
statute's use to establish a standard).
What triggers the duty of the landlord to repair leased premises, in lead paint cases,
however, is in question. See notes 18-21 and accompanying text supra.
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With regard to these latter facts, the Court of Appeals relied
on a Louisiana lead-poisoning case, Davis v. Royal Globe
Insurance Co. 21, with facts and issues the court characterized as
"remarkably similar" to the instant case. In citing Davis, which
initially held for the plaintiff, the court noted that both the Louisiana and Maryland mothers were ignorant of the true cause of
their children's maladies. However, the Maryland court did not
note that Davis is distinguishable by the active precautions the
mother took: stopping the children from eating the flakes and
instructing them not to do so again; sweeping the flakes from the
floor; complaining to the apartment manager several times, even
to the point of offering to buy the paint herself to correct the
27
condition.
Therefore, despite any knowledge of the danger by the landlord and any active precautions by the mother to remedy the
paint flakes danger except for sweeping the floor, Caroline ruled
that as a matter of law the mother was not supersedingly negligent. The Court of Appeals in Caroline appears thereby to be
holding the parent to a lesser standard of care than the courts in
Farley, Katz, and Davis. Therefore, it seems that very seldom will
evidence of a superseding cause be put to the jury or be sufficient
to circumvent or nullify the statutory prohibition against imputation of negligence between parent and child. At least in lead paint
poisoning cases, the parent need only advise the landlord one
time of the flaking condition, reasonably supervise the child, and
sweep away the paint chips daily in order to escape being held
independently liable. The "somewhat extraordinary situation"
taking the infant out of the statutory protection, and into the
superseding cause jeopardy, would fortunately seem to be nothing
short of a parent feeding the child paint flakes for breakfast.
By eliminating instructions to the jury on the mother's superseding negligence in this case, the Court of Appeals has in
effect served notice that parental ignorance and inaction will not
indirectly be imputed to the child via the superseding cause doc26. 223 So. 2d 912, 918-19, rev'd on other grounds, 257 La. 523, 242 So. 2d 839 (1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911 (1971).
27. It may be that Ms. Caroline did remind the landlord of the paint-flaking during
the tenancy and did instruct Dawn not to eat the paint chips. If so, the court's opinion
would probably have mentioned these facts since they would have strengthened the court's
position.
It should also be noted that, even though Ms. Caroline was not aware of lead paint
poisoning specifically, she should have realized that any foreign substance in a child's
mouth is inherently dangerous and, therefore, should have taken more active precautions
to remedy the danger.
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trine in any conceivable lead paint suit by a tenant against a
landlord. This is not, however, imposing strict liability because
it must be shown that the child's injuries were proximately
caused by lead paint chips negligently permitted by the landlord
to be present on the property.
Caroline does not absolutely preclude a finding of superseding negligence. Thus, it is still possible, in limited situations, to
impute parental negligence onto the child and thereby abnegate
the landlord's liability. This abnegation, coupled with the child's
lack of recourse against the parent,"8 leaves the child without a
remedy even though the child is injured. Legislation either to
remove the remaining immunity of suit between parent and child
or to ban any imputation of negligence on a child short of wanton
or malicious conduct by the parent or guardian would finally
provide full recovery rights for the child.
APPENDIX:

LEAD PAINT POISONING

Although Caroline is the first lead-based paint poisoning
case to reach the Court of Appeals of Maryland, lead poisoning
is a hidden, nationwide epidemic. Authorities estimate that up
to 400,000 children become lead sick each year. Of these, 200 die,
with two-year-olds comprising more than fifty percent of that
total. Approximately 12,000 to 16,000 children are treated and
survive; nevertheless, half of them suffer irreversible mental retardation. In Baltimore, Cleveland, and Boston, authorities estimate that up to ten percent of all preschool children living in
slums may be lead sick.29 From 1931 to 1957, Baltimore alone had
601 reported cases of lead-poisoned children, with 112 fatalities.
During the first half of 1974, 290 Baltimore youngsters were discovered with abnormally high blood lead levels. There were also
twelve cases of blood poisoning. 0
The primary cause of lead poisoning is the oral ingestion of
materials containing lead. Ingestion of lead-based paint with a
lead content in excess of one percent is most common. Since 1940,
the use of lead-based paint in the United States has been steadily
declining.3 Consequently, the greatest threat of lead poisoning
28. See note 5 supra.
29. 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6130o2 (91st Cong., 2d Sess.) (1970).
30. See Preamble, Baltimore, Md., Ordinance 1504, June 9, 1958 for the figures from
1931 to 1957. See Baltimore Evening Sun, July 12, 1974, § C, at 1, col. 5 for the 1974
figures.
31. Griggs, Environmental Factorsin Childhood Lead Poisoning, 187 J.A.M.A. 703,
706 (1964).
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lurks in the 25,500,000 occupied housing units built prior to 1940,
forty percent of the nation's housing supply." In Baltimore City
there are 183,000 pre-1940 units representing sixty percent of the
33
municipal inventory.
Remedial action has been launched with the adoption of federal, state, and city statutes and regulations. However, none of
these efforts provide the ultimate solution: the complete ban of
lead paint in all residential dwellings and removal of old and
34
present coats therein which are lead-based.
At the federal level, Congress, in the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, originally enacted in 1971 and amended
in 1973, has authorized grants and studies to alleviate the problems of lead-based paint poisoning. Congress has authorized the
Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
to award grants to public agencies of local government units and
private non-profit organizations for up to ninety percent of the
cost of programs to detect and treat incidents of lead-based paint
poisoning. 35 The Secretary has also been empowered to authorize
grants in order to identify areas presenting a high risk to the
health of residents because of the presence of lead-based paints
and to develop and implement programs to eliminate the haz3
ard. 1
The 1973 Amendments, in addition, authorize grants to state
agencies for centralized laboratory facilities to analyze lead paint
specimens.3 1 Moreover, the Secretaries of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development and of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare have been directed to organize
independently a research program to determine the nature and
extent of the problem in the United States. 38 To supplement the
grants and the studies, the Chairman of the Consumer Product
Safety Commission has been directed to conduct research to ascertain the safe level of lead in residential paint products and to
32.

U.S.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS BY HOUSEHOLD COMPOSI-

TION, FINAL REPORT HC (7)-l (1973).
33. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, FINAL

REPORT PHC (1)-19, Baltimore, Md. SMSA (1972).
34. For a summary of current research and federal legislation, see Lin-Fu,
PreventingLead Poisoning in Children, 2 CHILDREN TODAY 2 (Jan.-Feb. 1973).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 4801 (1970), as amended by Act of Nov. 9, 1973, Pub.L. No. 93-151,
§ 1, 87 Stat. 560.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 4811 (1970), as amended by Act of Nov. 9, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93151, § 2, 87 Stat. 560. Regulations promulgated prior to the 1973 Amendments governing
the award of grants are found in 42 C.F.R. §§ 91.1-17 (1973).
37. Act of Nov. 9, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-151 § 1(e), 87 Stat. 560.
38. Act of Nov. 9, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-151, § 3, 87 Stat. _.
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forward his recommendations to Congress. 3 A National Childhood Lead Based Paint Poisoning Advisory Board has also been
authorized. 0
In addition to authorizing grants and research programs, the
Congress has also posited certain affirmative standards for the
use of lead-based paint. For example, Congress has directed the
Secretaries of Health, Education, and Welfare and Housing and
Urban Development to prohibit the application of lead-based
paint to toys, furniture, and cooking, drinking, or eating utensils
manufactured and distributed after November 1973.11 In addition
Congress has set the definition of lead-based paint as .5 percent
prior to December 31, 1974, and .06 percent after December 31,
1974, unless the Chairman of the Consumer Product Safety Commission determines in his authorized study a different level, not
to exceed .5 percent, to be safe."
Of particular interest is that the federal definition of lead
paint supersedes and declares null and void all state and local
laws providing for a different requirement, prohibition, or standard relating to the lead content in paints or other similar
surface-coating materials.4 3 However, a House Committee Report
indicates clearly that this federal preemption applies only to provide a uniform national definition of lead paint. 4 Thus, state and
local governments are still free to impose stricter regulations concerning other aspects of the lead paint problem, such as landlord
eradication of existing coats of lead paint.
In the Act, specific concern has focused on government
owned housing. Prior to the 1973 Amendments and pursuant to
the grant of authority in section 4831 of title 42, the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare promulgated regulations which
banned the use of lead-based paint on all interior surfaces and dry
exterior surfaces accessible to children under seven years of age
in any residential structure constructed or rehabilitated by a federal agency." The 1973 Amendment specifically directed the Sec39. Id.
40. Act of Nov. 9, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-151, § 7, 87 Stat.
41. Act of Nov. 9, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-151, § 5, 87 Stat. _. See also 21 C.F.R. §
191.9 (a)(6) (ii) (1973).
42. Act of Nov. 9, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-151, §§ 3(b), 6, 87 Stat. 565-67. See also 21
C.F.R. 191.9(a) (6) (i) (1973).
43. Act of Nov. 9, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-151, § 7(e), 87 Stat. 565, 568.
44. H.R. REP. No. 373, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973).
45. 42 C.F.R. §§ 90.2(g), .3 (1973). See also 42 C.F.R. § 90.1-.5 (1973). Subsequently,
pursuant to 42 C.F.R. pt. 90, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, owner
of many housing units, promulgated its own regulations. See 24 C.F.R. pt. 35 (1973).
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retary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development to
establish procedures to eliminate lead paint hazards in housing
under his control and to notify purchasers and tenants of the
government-owned,housing of the hazards of lead paint poisoning.4
Several federal district court cases have, through recognition
of more stringent city regulations, prevented the Department of
Housing and Urban Development from selling housing units with
lead-based paint surfaces to private citizens. In City-Wide Coalition Against Childhood Lead Paint Poisoning v. Philadelphia
Housing Authority47 the court refused to stay a preliminary injunction precluding the Department of Housing and Urban Development from selling housing units to private citizens or organizations until it complied with HUD regulations and the more
stringent City of Philadelphia Department of Public Health rules
requiring removal of lead-based paint from all surfaces of the
structure being sold. The court pointed out that, although the
city's regulations were more stringent than those of HUD, which
required only that the lead-based paint should be painted over by
non-lead based paint, the city regulations had to be followed
because they carried out the spirit and intent of Lead Based Paint
Poisoning Prevention Act.
Although it does not discuss the Act, City of Philadelphiav.
48
Page is also an important case with regard to the sale of government owned housing. In Page, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development was found liable for a breach of an implied
warranty of habitability. A home "rehabilitated" by HUD pursuant to HUD regulations contained quantities of lead-based
paint in excess of the standards deemed safe by the City of Philadelphia Code. Thus, it seems that local regulations, not pertaining to the content of paint to be used in housing, will be enforced
against the government even though the local regulations are
more stringent than the federal agency's regulations.
In Maryland, the use of lead-based paint has been limited by
article 43, section 117A(a) of the Maryland Annotated Code,
which provides: "It is unlawful to use lead-based paint on any
interior surface or on any article intended for household use, except a lead-based industrial paint applied to a household appliance, or any exterior surface to which children may be commonly
46.
47.
48.

Act of Nov. 9, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-151, § 4, 87 Stat. 565, 566.
356 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
363 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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exposed or on a porch of any dwelling." Subsection (b) makes a
violator of subsection (a) guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to
a fine of up to $1,000 or imprisonment up to thirty days or both.
Every day the violation continues is considered a separate offense. 9
Section 117B(a) of article 43 permits a lessee to deposit
rental payments into an escrow account should the lessor fail to
remove lead-based paint from a residential surface easily accessible to children within twenty days after notice that the leadbased paint is present. The money deposited will be released to
the lessor upon certification by the local health authority that the
premises have been inspected and the violations corrected; otherwise it will be released to the lessee or other person who has
corrected the violation, upon presentation of a bill for correcting
the violation and upon certification by the health authority that
the violations have been corrected. Subsection (c) prohibits the
lessor from evicting or raising the rent of the tenant for invoking
article 117B. The statute specifically reserves all other rights and
remedies available to the lessee at law or equity.50 Additionally,
the Department of Health has instituted a mailing procedure to
facilitate the submission for analysis of paint-scraping samples
from all over the state."'
Maryland did consider a stricter lead paint removal statute
which would have aided the children. A Senate Bill would have
required a landlord, by July 1, 1972, to remove or cover with a
permanent adhesive coating any lead-based paint on any interior
or exterior surfaces, including porches, to which children would
be commonly exposed and to refrain from any such use of leadbased paint in the future. However, the bill was amended in
committee and only the prospective use of lead-based paint was
prohibited. The present law requires notice to the landlord before
any removal is required."
Finally, the Baltimore City Code requires "conspicuous"
warnings on cans of paint containing one or more percent lead.
These warnings must indicate that the product is not suitable for
use on the interior surfaces of areas used for the care of children
49. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 117A (Supp. 1973).
50. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 117B (Supp. 1973).
51. Note, Lead PaintPoisoning:Legal Remedies and Preventive Actions, 6 COLUM.
J. LAW & Soc. PROB. 325, 333 n.54 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Note, Lead Paint].
52. Compare MD.ANN. CODE art. 43 §§ 117A and 117B (Supp. 1973) and its predecessor, ch. 495, § 1 [1971] Md. Laws 1105, with S.B. 814 (1971).
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or on interior surfaces of dwellings. Violators may be fined up to
$100 by the Commissioner of Health.5 3

EMPLOYMENT

CONTRACTS-COVENANT

RESTRICTING COM-

Two YEARS HELD ENFORCEABLEMiliward v. Gerstung InternationalSport Education, Inc.I

PETITION BY EMPLOYEE FOR

In the spring of 1968 Siegfried Gerstung, the proprietor of
Gerstung International Sport Education, Inc., a summer day
camp emphasizing physical education, met Doug Millward, the
well-known coach of the Baltimore Bays, a professional soccer
team. Gerstung proceeded to employ Millward as a summer camp
counselor and a winter sports teacher. Following various interim
employment arrangements, a one-year contract was signed in
which the parties convenanted that Millward would not enter
into competition with Gerstung, directly or indirectly, for a pe2
riod of two years anywhere in the Baltimore metropolitan area.
Millward worked for Gerstung for the year covered by the
contract and for several months following its expiration. Then, in
the winter of 1972, Millward resigned and subsequently accepted
a position as director of a competing summer camp.3 Gerstung,

53. BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. 11, §§ 80-85 (1966). A comparable law in Philadelphia defines "conspicious" with explicit typeset requirements. PHILADELPHIA, PA.,
CODE, Dept. of Public Health, Reg. 4 (1966), as cited in Note, Lead Paint, supra note 51,
at 329. See also Baltimore City Health Dept., S.S. 696 (Nov. 20, 1969) which provides for
the removal of lead-based paint and treatment of houses, and for various exemptions).

1.
2.

268 Md. 483, 302 A.2d 14 (1973).
See id. at 484-86, 302 A.2d at 15. The covenant reads as follows:
"[Millward] also agrees that he will not for a period of two (2) years after the
termination of this Agreement or any renewal period thereof, directly or indirectly,
engage in the same or similar business, namely Gerstung Inter-Sport activities,
physical education or sport instructions of any kind in the City of Baltimore or the
surrounding counties where programs of the School are conducted, either individually or as a member of a firm or as a stockholder in a corporation. He further agrees
never to solicit, directly or indirectly, divert or take away any of the patronage of
the School."
Id. at 484-85, 302 A.2d at 15. The contract containing this clause was a one-year contract
signed on September 4, 1970. Although Millward continued to be employed in various
capacities by Gerstung following the termination date of this contract, the court treated
the termination period as beginning to run September 4, 1971. The court did not consider
whether an oral agreement, similar to the one between the parties, to continue various
aspects of the employment would validly continue the operation of the restrictive
covenant.
3. The camp would be located very close to Gerstung's camp in Baltimore County
and would be in direct competition with the Gerstung camp. Millward's new employer,
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alleging breach of the restrictive covenant, 4 sued to enjoin Millward's employment. The trial court granted the injunction, and
Millward appealed.
The Maryland Court of Appeals, affirming, held that the
uniqueness of the employee's reputation and qualifications, together with other factors present in this situation, demonstrated
that the restriction was reasonable and therefore enforceable.'
Although the court recognized the nature of Millward's personal
contact with the customers as a possible basis for finding the
covenant reasonable, it emphasized Millward's unique qualifications and reputation. In strongly suggesting that unique personal
attributes-a reputation among members of the general public-is a basis for enforcing a restrictive covenant, the court has
provided the employer with unwarranted protection at the expense of legitimate interests of both the employee and the public.
This Recent Decision, focusing on the Maryland opinions, will
review the history of restrictive covenants in employment contracts and will demonstrate that enforcement of a covenant restricting the employee's use of his personal reputation is unjustified by the reasoning of prior Maryland cases, and unjustifiable
as a matter of policy.
The modern history of the common law treatment of restrictive covenants in employment contracts begins with the English
case of Mitchel v. Reynolds. I In this case, the defendant, a baker,
subleased a bakery to the plaintiff; the terms of the agreement
included the defendant's promise not to compete in the parish
during the term of the lease.7 The court, holding that the covenant was enforceable, stated that the restraint imposed on the
baker was reasonable because it was supported by adequate consideration and was ancillary to a valid contract.8 The court distinguished "general" restraints from "particular" restraints. The
former were termed illegal per se: "[W]here the restraint is genSports Camps, Inc., mailed brochures prominently displaying Millward's picture a month
before Gerstung was known to mail its brochures. The chancellor also found that Sports
Camps' brochure copied Gerstung's fee schedule. Id. at 487, 302 A.2d at 16.
4. Id. at 484, 302 A.2d at 15.
5. For a discussion of facts demonstrating that a restriction is "reasonable" see text
accompanying notes 17-24 infra.
6. 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
7. The defendant gave a bond of fifty pounds to insure his compliance with the
covenants in the sublease. The plaintiff brought an action on the bond to collect the face
value when the defendant opened a new bakery business within the same parish in violation of the covenant. Id.
8. Id. at 182, 24 Eng. Rep. at 349.
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eral not to exercise a trade throughout the kingdom . . . [it]
must be void, being of no benefit to either party, and only oppressive . . . '.Courts, on the other hand, enforced particular restraint without a further inquiry if the restraints were supported
by consideration and were ancillary to a valid contract.
In the years that followed, the English courts turned from
these formalized distinctions and began to evaluate "particular"
restraints to determine whether or not they were "reasonable" in
view of the facts and circumstances: The courts enforced only
"reasonable" restrictions on the employee's right to compete."0
Similarly, American courts at first adhered to the "generalparticular" distinction set forth in Mitchel and characterized
both nationwide and statewide restrictions as "general" restraints and therefore illegal per se." Gradually, however, courts
abandoned the mechanical distinction between these classifications in favor of an approach in which the facts and circumstances surrounding both classes of restraint on an individual's right
to compete against a former employer were examined to deter2
mine the reasonableness of the restrictive covenant.'
9. Id. at 182, 24 Eng. Rep. at 348.
10. See Homer v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735, 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P. 1831). The plaintiff,
a surgeon-dentist, and the defendant, a less accomplished dentist, entered into a contract
by which the defendant agreed that he would work for the plaintiff as an assistant in
exchange for a salary and the plaintiff's promise to train him in the skills of dental surgery.
The defendant also agreed that upon termination of this employment he would not practice his skills within a 100 mile radius of the plaintiff's city of business. Upon termination
of his employment the defendant breached this latter covenant, and the plaintiff brought
suit to enjoin the breach. After noting that the covenant did not fall under the "general"
restraint classification, the court stated, "[Tihe greater question is, whether this is a
reasonable restraint of trade." The court refused to enforce the covenant because it was
more restrictive than necessary to afford the employer fair protection. Id. at 742, 131 Eng.
Rep. at 287.
Traditionally, in England all restraints of trade were presumed to be invalid and the
burden was on the one seeking to enforce the restrictive covenant to show that the covenant was reasonable. This rule was reversed in the case of Tallis v. Tallis, 1 El. & Bl. 391,
118 Eng. Rep. 482 (Q.B. 1853), and the burden was shifted to the party seeking to escape
the terms of the covenant: As long as the covenant was supported by adequate consideration, the party must show it was an unreasonable restraint of trade to avoid its enforcement. This rule, however, was in turn rejected during the early 1900's in favor of a
reversion to the traditional rule. See Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73
HARV. L. REV. 625, 640 (1960).
11. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Kidder, 10 Barb. 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851), where the court
recognized the general rule that a restrictive statewide covenant is void on its face before
it granted the defendant's demurrer on the basis that the covenant preventing co-partners
who had sold their business to the plaintiff from competing against him for five years in
an area encompassing almost all of the state.
12. See, e.g., Roberts v. Lemont, 73 Neb. 365, 102 N.W. 770 (1905), in which the
court, holding that the burden created by the covenant was too great because it prevented
the defendant from ever engaging in the insurance business anywhere, refused to enforce
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Maryland law reflects this general approach. In Rosenstein
v. Zentz, 13 an early Maryland case, the court reviewed the English
and American authorities and indicated that it would follow what
it considered the general weight of authority and would enforce a
restrictive covenant only if it met the test of "reasonability." The
court stated that at least one factor demonstrating reasonability-that the services contracted for were uniquely those of the
employee-was not present in the case, and hence the court
would not uphold the covenant. 4
Several years later the Court of Appeals reviewed the
Rosenstein decision in Deuerling v. City Baking Co. 5 The situation in Deuerlingwas strikingly different from that of Rosenstein.
In Deuerling, a bakery salesman covered a regular delivery route
for his employer; the nature of the services rendered brought the
employee into day-to-day personal contact with the employer's
customers. The court found that this personal contact was a factor indicating that it would be reasonable to enforce a covenant
the covenant; Lanzit v. J.W. Sefton Mfg. Co., 184 11. 326, 56 N.E. 393 (1900), in which
the court refused to enforce a covenant restricting a salesman of paper containers from
producing and selling such containers anywhere in the state for ten years because the
effect of the covenant was to compel the defendant to engage in some other trade or to
move his family to another state; Rakestraw v. Lanier, 104 Ga. 188, 30 S.E. 735 (1898), in
which the court stated that covenants restricting competition are held in disfavor by the
courts because they injure the parties who make them by diminishing their means of
procuring a livelihood, because they tempt improvident persons to limit their future
opportunities for the sake of present gain, and because they deprive the community of
their services in the occupation at which they are most useful and capable. See also Blake,
Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. Rv. 625, 643-44 (1960).
13. 118 Md. 564, 85 A. 675 (1912). In this case the defendant, a piano salesmanrepairman, was employed by the owners of a number of department stores under a single
ownership. A dispute arose among the owners, and the business was divided with the
result that the plaintiff retained the piano business. The defendant then contracted with
the plaintiff to sell and repair pianos exclusively for the plaintiff within an area encompassing Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. The defendant breached this
covenant by returning to the service of the past owners who had re-entered the piano sales
business. The Court of Appeals refused to enforce the covenant on the grounds that the
services performed were not unique. It should be noted that the covenant in this case
restrained competition during the term of employment rather than after the employment
had terminated. Subsequent opinions, however, have cited this case to illustrate the
manner in which post-employment covenants should be analyzed.
14. Id. at 575, 85 A. at 679. The court was applying the general rule as it found it to
be in both England and the United States:
"[Where a contract stipulated for special, unique or extraordinary personal
services or acts, or where the services to be rendered are purely intellectual, or are
peculiar and individual in character, the Court will grant an injunction. . . . But
where the services are material or mechanical, or are not peculiar or individual, the
party will be left to his action for damages."
Id. at 571, 85 A. at 678, quoting William Rogers Mfg. Co. v. Rogers, 58 Conn. 356, __,
20 A. 467, 468, 7 L.R.A. 779, 781 (1890).
15. 155 Md. 280, 141 A. 542 (1928).
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restricting the employee's subsequent employment: "[T]o restrain the employee after the termination of the service from
engaging in that business for a very limited time and over a
circumscribed area, so that the employer can protect himself
from the damage resulting to him, with no corresponding or superior benefit to the employee [justifies enforcement]."'" The personal contacts between employee and customer here were higher
than the normal personal contact in a sales transaction. The distinction from the normal selling relationship justified enforcement.17
The court has also found that an employee's appropriation
of the employer's customers will justify enforcement of a covenant. In Ruhl v. F.A. Bartlett Tree Co.'" the employee had been
employed by Bartlett for a number of years and had covenanted
not to compete against Bartlett for a period of two years after the
termination of employment in the six-county area serviced by the
employer. 9 Ruhl left Bartlett's employ and opened his own busi16. Id. at 291, 141 A. at 546.
17. Id. at 287-88, 141 A. at 545. The employee in this case was a driver-salesman
employed by the appellee in his bakery business. The employee's position was that of a
route salesman, and he was assigned a specific route by the employer; this route represented the appellant's territory. The employer and employee entered into an employment
contract which was renewable automatically from week to week until the employment was
terminated. By covenant the employee was restrained from soliciting customers or selling
similar products for a period of three months after the termination of his employment
within any territory to which the employee had been assigned by the employer during the
last six months of his employment. After giving notice the employee left the service of the
appellee, and four days later he began working as a route salesman for a rival bakery in
the same territory in which he had previously worked for the employer. The court held
that, in view of the peculiar dependency of the employer upon the employee's contacts
with the customers in this bakery business, the covenant was reasonable and enforceable
against the employee.
For other examples of personal contacts between the employee and the customers
which the Court of Appeals has found sufficient to support a restrictive post-employment
covenant, see Ruhl v. F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 245 Md. 118, 225 A.2d 288 (1967)
(covenant restricting the manager of a tree surgeon company from competing within a six
county area for a period of two years after termination of employment), discussed at notes
18-20 infra, and Toloman Laundry, Inc. v. Walker, 171 Md. 7, 187 A. 836 (1936) (covenant
preventing route salesman of laundry service from competing in assigned territory for one
year after termination of employment). For an example of personal contact which will not
support a restrictive covenant, see Tawney v. Mutual System, Inc., 186 Md. 508, 47 A.2d
372 (1946) (covenant restricting loan company employee's ability to compete, within
entire Baltimore business area, for two years after employment).
18. 245 Md. 118, 225 A.2d 288 (1967).
19. Id. at 118-19, 225 A.2d at 290. Ruhl entered the contract with Bartlett when he
was appointed to the position of area manager for the company in an area encompassing
five Maryland Eastern shore counties and a contiguous county in Delaware. Ruhl's duties
included soliciting new customers for the tree care service and supervising those services
performed for existing customers. To aid him in his duties he was given a customer file
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ness offering identical services in an identical geographical area.
While recognizing that enforcement would cause serious economic hardship for Ruhl, the court nevertheless found the covenant reasonable in duration and area and not detrimental to the
public interest. The court clearly balanced the economic injury
to the employee against the protectible interest of the employer
(whose customers apparently had been contacted in some way by
Ruhl). Since the court viewed the terms of the covenant itself as

reasonable, the court enforced

it.

2

1

Up to this point it would thus seem that the Maryland rule
could be stated as follows: If a degree of personal contact between
the employee and the customer is shown, and there is some
additional aggravating element, the employer's interest is elevated to a level where enforcement is justified; further, the covenant must be reasonable in area and duration. It therefore is of
great importance to determine what additional elements will
serve to aggravate the situation and to justify enforcement. The
cases reviewed thus far indicate that an assigned route or an
inference that the employee has contacted the employer's customers are such factors. The Rosenstein case also suggests that
unique abilities or services might serve, in the proper circumstances, as the aggravating element.
Several recent cases further illuminate this theory. In two of
these cases the court denied enforcement. In Becker v. Bailey,"
the employee, Bailey, left Becker's employ and immediately set
up a business offering identical services in the same geographical
area. Becker sued for enforcement of a restrictive covenant which
proposed to prevent exactly this kind of competition."2 The court
containing the names and addresses of the Bartlett customers within his area. After
continuing in this position for over three years, Ruhl left Bartlett and began a tree care
service of his own, servicing the same territory he had worked for Bartlett. Two-thirds of
Ruhl's clientele consisted of past Bartlett customers.
20. Id. at 127-28, 225 A.2d at 293-94. The court evaluated the reasonableness of the
covenant:
In this case, the tree business is highly competitive, with companies similar to
Bartlett operating in the area involved. No danger of a monopoly is apparent. On
the facts, we find that the restrictive covenant is not injurious to the public interest,
and that it is valid, if the period of time and area involved are not unreasonable.
Id. For another example of a balancing of interests in a case involving restrictive covenants
see Deuerling, notes 15-17, supra, and accompanying text.
The court also relied heavily on Blake's analysis of restrictive covenants, supra note
10. 245 Md. at 124.
21. 268 Md. 93, 299 A.2d 835 (1973).
22. See id. at 94-95, 299 A.2d at 836-37. The covenant reads as follows:
[fIn the event this agreement is terminated, either voluntarily, involuntarily or by
mutual consent, [it is agreed] that [Bailey] will not engage in a similar or com-
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reviewed the authorities and then stated that Bailey was an "unskilled worker whose services are not unique." 3 The court did not
find an aggravating element which would justify enforcement.
While Bailey had had personal contact with Becker's customers
and solicitation of them was possible, the court found that such
solicitation had not in fact occurred and, therefore, refused enforcement. 4 Similarly in Budget Rent a Car of Washington, Inc.,
5 the court stated
v. Raab"
the Maryland rule" and concluded that
since no aggravating element could be discerned the covenant
was unenforceable.
If this analysis is applied to the facts of the Miliward case,
it becomes clear that the court's reasoning in Miliward is not
consistent with the past cases. While in Miliward there obviously
is personal contact between Millward and the clients (the children who attend the Gerstung camp), the factors which in the
petitive business for himself or for any competitor or in any capacity for any competitor, in the District of Columbia, Prince George's County, Anne Arundel County,
and Montgomery County for a period of two (2) years from the date this Agreement
is terminated in any manner.
23. Id. at 99, 299 A.2d at 839.
24. Id. at 102, 299 A.2d at 840. The court reviewed the facts:
Here, the chancellor specifically found that there was no solicitation by Bailey of
his former employer's customers. As we see it, this case falls into the category of
the Tawney-Silver type of exception where the restrictive covenant is unenforceable. While this covenant, which by its terms does not expire until February 4, 1974,
is unenforceable to prevent the kind of competition engaged in here, this decision
would not prohibit the seeking of appropriate relief if Bailey started soliciting the
customers of the Becker Title Service.
The court found that fifteen of the eighteen customers that Bailey served with his own
service had never used the Becker service. Id. at 95, 299 A.2d at 837.
25. 268 Md. 478, 302 A.2d 11 (1973). In this case the defendant, the proprietor of a
gas station in Bethesda, Maryland, entered into a sub-franchise license agreement with
the plaintiff, by which the former agreed to lease a fleet of cars from the plaintiff and in
turn to lease them to the general public. By a covenant in this license agreement Raab
agreed that he would not compete against Budget Rent A Car in the vehicle renting
business within the city limits of Bethesda for a period of two years after the agreement
was terminated. The agreement was then terminated by mutual consent and the plaintiff
sought to enjoin Raab's wife from using the lot of Raab's gas station to rent vehicles to
the general public. The Court of Appeals refused to enforce the covenant. See note 27,
infra.
26. Id. at 482, 302 A.2d at 13. The court's statement of the general rule is accurate
but not complete. The court fails to note the factual analysis that must be undertaken in
order to determine the reasonableness of the restraints.
27. Id. at 482, 302 A.2d at 13-14. The court examined these elements as follows:
While on its face, the covenant here is reasonable as to both time and space,
other circumstances present in this case make the restriction unenforceable. Here,
Raab is an unskilled worker whose services are not unique; there was no solicitation
of customers; nor was there any use of trade secrets, assigned routes, customer lists
or development of personal contacts with customers as an integral part of the
service rendered.
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past have served to elevate this normal contact to a level where
protection is justified 8 are not present, since the most important
factor in the previous cases has been the extent of the employee's
active solicitation of his previous employer's customers. Here,
Millward did not solicit Gerstung's former customers or make
other efforts to attract former customers to his new employer's
camp. Rather, the solicitation was by Millward's new employer
who mailed a brochure to a large number of people in the same
geographical area."9 While the court considered this to be an important factor, it is questionable whether the employee's livelihood should be restricted as a result of actions taken by his new
employer. Thus, in order to uphold the covenant on the basis of
Millward's personal contacts with the children, some direct
connection between Millward's breach of the covenant and the
effect on Gerstung's business would be necessary. For example,
if Millward suggested the names of potential customers to his new
employer on the basis of his knowledge of Gerstung's customers,
a direct connection justifying enforcement would be shown. 0
The Court of Appeals did not, however, rely on personal contacts to justify enforcement. Rather, the court emphasized the
"uniqueness" of Millward's reputation and his "unique" stature
as a well-known sports figure. This indicates that the Court was
not relying on Millward's reputation with his clients as a basis for
enforcement, but rather on his reputation among members of the
general public. The logical implication of this is that any figure
with a well-known name could be prevented from accepting employment in any situation where his reputation was of any significance. There is here a striking dissimilarity from the reasoning of
past cases. The court here has not weighed the competing interests of the employee and his employer. In failing to weigh these
interests the court has departed from sound judicial reasoning
and has embarked on a new policy of enforcement based on public
reputation.
The court in this case apparently equated Millward's unique
reputation with unique services which, the court concluded, was
an aggravating element which would justify enforcement. How28. See text accompanying notes 15-21, supra.
29. Id. at 487, 302 A.2d at 16.
30. The court clearly relied heavily on the brochure, described in note 3, supra, but
Millward was not shown to be the motivating force behind the mailing of this brochure.
The court did not deal with this point and made no attempt to distinguish between
attempted solicitation of Gerstung's customers by Sports Camps, Inc., from any actions
which may have been taken by Millward.
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ever, the one Maryland case dealing with this point, Rosenstein,3
is clearly distinguishable. Moreover, both Miliward and
Rosenstein involve covenants restricting the employee during the
term of the employment contract. While the employer's desire to
have the exclusive services of the employee during the term of the
contract is justifiable, his desire to restrain the employee following termination of the contract is not. Gerstung had the full benefit of Millward's reputation during the term of the contract; he
exploited it to the full. Gerstung thus received the full benefit of
what he bargained for-Millward's stature in the community.32 In
addition, allowing Gerstung to extend his period of control beyond the term of contract is detrimental to the public interest:
Since Millward is uniquely qualified, any restraint on his employment opportunities deprives the public of a unique contribution.
If such a deprivation is to be justified, it must be done only after
a careful comparison of the loss to the public with the protectible
interest of the employer.
The rule, as it exists in Maryland today, provides that only
"reasonable" restraints on an individual's right to compete
against his former employer will be enforced. A restraint is judged
reasonable in terms of the area encompassed by the restrictions,
the duration of the restraints, and the economic hardship it
places upon the employee when this hardship is balanced against
the employer's need for protection. The court in each case must
analyze the facts and circumstances surrounding the covenant for
evidence of factors, such as assigned routes, customer lists, and
solicitation of former customers, which may elevate the ordinary
personal contact between the employee and the employer's customers to a level that endangers the employer's relationship with
his customers and which therefore justifies restraining the employee.
While professing to apply rules established in past Maryland
cases, the Court of Appeals in Miliward, perhaps without realizing it, recognized a new factor-the uniqueness of an employee's
reputation-that the employer may use to justify the restraints
31. See Rosenstein, supra note 13.
32. It could be argued that one in possession of a unique reputation is in a position
to bargain for adequate compensation in exchange for the hardship resulting from the
restrictive covenant. Although such a person does have more bargaining power than, for
example, a route salesman, his bargaining power would vary with his fame. The court
would be forced to draw lines between the very famous, the mildly famous, and the
unknown. Even if such distinctions were possible, it is not only the employee who suffers
injury as a result of a restrictive covenant; the loss to the public of his services must also
be considered.
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placed upon his employees. Such a liberal expansion of the rule
may well have the effect of substantially curtailing the economic
mobility of well-known public figures. Any such restriction on
human resources is detrimental to a free enterprise system, and
the loss to the public is magnified when the productive activities
of truly unique individuals are so circumscribed. The interests of
employers would seem to be adequately protected by enforcement
of restrictive employment covenants when one of the previously
recognized factors, without this new factor, can be shown to exist.
The result in Millward may be justified since there was evidence indicating the strong possibility of Millward's participation
in the solicitation of Gerstung's customers, a factor which could
have justified enforcing the covenant under the holdings in past
decisions. However, a unique reputation has not previously been
recognized as a factor justifying past employment restrictive covenants. Such a course of analysis invites abuse of these covenants.

CRIMINAL LAW-JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS-COMMON LAW PRESUMPTION OF CRIMINAL INCAPACITY OF MINORS UNDER AGE FOURTEEN
INAPPLICABLE

TO JUVENILE

DELINQUENCY

PROCEEDINGS-In

re

Davis.'
In May 1972, police observed 12 year-old Bryan Davis and a
companion attempting to force entry into an automobile by opening the front vent window with a brick. Both children were arrested, and the States Attorney thereafter filed a petition in the
Circuit Court of Baltimore City, Division of Juvenile Causes,2
alleging Davis to be a delinquent child. Police testimony established that the companion actually attempted the entry, and it
characterized Davis' role as that of a "lookout." Davis was found
to be a delinquent and was placed on probation.
On appeal Davis urged that the state erred in failing to consider and to rebut the common law presumption of criminal incapacity on the part of an infant below the age of fourteen.' The
Maryland Court of Special Appeals, in rejecting this contention,
1. 17 Md. App. 98, 299 A.2d 856 (1973).
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 51(a) (1973), recodified in MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud.
Proc. Art., § 3-803(b) (1974), confers jurisdiction in juvenile causes upon a division of the
Circuit Court of Baltimore City.
3. Davis also contended that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that he was a
delinquent child. After reviewing the evidence, however, the court found it legally sufficient to support the findings below. In re Davis, 17 Md. App. 98, 107, 299 A.2d 856, 86162 (1973).
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said that the Juvenile Causes Act 4 changed the substantive criminal law by creating the "delinquent act," 5 an offense not known
at common law nor legally considered a crime. The statute's effect, according to the court, was to obviate the need for the court
or the prosecution to consider criminal capacity since juvenile
proceedings determine only whether the child has committed a
delinquent act and is in need of supervision, not whether the child
has committed a crime. "[T]he result [for the child under juvenile court jurisdiction], stated in terms of the common law, is
that the age under which a person is conclusively presumed to be
incapable of committing a crime has been raised from seven to
eighteen." 6
At common law a criminal intent or mens rea must accompany the criminal act before the actor may be deemed guilty of
the commission of a crime. 7 Mens rea has been divided by Sanford H. Kadish s into two principal categories, aside from circumstances of justification and excuse. The first category is mens rea
4.

MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70 et seq. (1973), recodified in Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art.,

§ 3-801 et seq. (1974).
5. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-1(g) (1973), recodified in Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3801(j) (1974), defines a "delinquent act" as "an act which is in violation of Article 66 1/2
of this Code, any traffic violation, or an act which would be a crime if done by a person
who is not a child" (emphasis added).
6. In re Davis, 17 Md. App. at 102, 299 A.2d at 859 (footnote omitted). Exempted
from juvenile court jurisdiction under Mo. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-2(d) (Supp. 1973),
recodified in Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-808 (1974) (with changes), are:
(1) . . . a child who has reached his 14th birthday, alleged to have done an act
which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime punishable by death or life
imprisonment (including a lessor offense or an offense arising out of the act alleged
to have been committed), unless an order removing the proceeding to the juvenile
court has been filed ....
(2) . . . a child who has reached his 16th birthday, alleged to have done an act in
violation of any provision of Article 66 1/2 or any other traffic law or ordinance
(other than manslaughter by automobile, possession of a stolen motor vehicle,
unauthorized use or occupancy of a motor vehicle, tampering with a motor vehicle,
or a violation of § 11-902 of Article 66 1/2 ....
(3) . . . a child who has reached his sixteenth birthday, alleged to have done an
act which, if committed by an adult, would be punishable by § 488 of Article 27
as robbery with a deadly weapon, unless an order removing the proceeding to the
juvenile court has been filed . ...
In addition, the juvenile court may waive its exclusive jurisdiction, pursuant to MD. ANN.
CODE art. 26, § 70-16(a) (1973), recodified in Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., §§ 3-816(a), (b), and
(e) (1974), over a child who has reached his fourteenth birthday, or a child under fourteen
charged with committing an act which, if committed by an adult, would be punishable
by death or life imprisonment.
7. Bradford v. State, 234 Md. 505, 512, 200 A.2d 150, 154 (1963), states that "[tihe
basic elements of a criminal offense (except those which are malum prohibitum) are the
act itself and the mens rea or intent to commit it ....
"
8. Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMB. L.J. 273 (1968).
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in its special sense-that which "refers only to the mental state
which is required by the definition of the offense to accompany
the act . . . ." For example, to convict Bryan Davis of the crime
of attempted larceny the state would be required to prove that he
had the intent to take, permanently and without legal warrant,
the personal property of another, with knowledge that it was not
his own. 0 The second category of mens rea is that of legal responsibility. This category recognizes such defenses as legal insanity
and infancy, and it is supported by the rationale that it is unjust
to attach penal consequences to acts done without sufficient mental capacity to understand their nature."
Recognizing that youthful acts were often innocent of evil
intent, the common law established arbitrary ages of discretion
below which a child is, in varying degrees, presumed incapable
of appreciating his acts and, thus, is not criminally liable for
them. The child below age seven is conclusively presumed to be
incapable of committing a crime.' 2 For children aged seven to
fourteen, there is a rebuttable and gradually diminishing presumption to the same effect.' 3 The burden is on the state to rebut
this presumption by showing that the child had sufficient maturity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act. Once the state
rebutted incapacity, the child became fully liable for his crime.
The Juvenile Causes Act was intended to mitigate the
harsher applications of the common law" whereby children were
held liable for the criminal consequences of their acts. 5 In theory,
the proceedings and dispositions of a juvenile court are neither
9. Id. at 274.
10. Murray v. State, 214 Md. 383, 387, 135 A.2d 314, 315 (1957).
11. Kadish, supra note 8, at 275.
12. The presumption of criminal incapacity is still available when the state proceeds
against the child in a criminal prosecution. Adams v. State, 8 Md. App. 684, 688-89, 262
A.2d 69, 72, cert. denied, 258 Md. 725, U.S. cert. denied, 400 U.S. 92 (1970); Prevatte v.
Director, 5 Md. App. 406, 412, 248 A.2d 170, 174 (1968).
Waiver proceedings may consider, although need not find, that the minor had sufficient mental capacity to understand the quality of his act. See MD. ANN. CODE, art. 26
§ 70-16(b) (2) (1973), recodified in Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-816(c) (2) (1974). Such a
finding should be made, however, since the later criminal prosecution would fail if the
requisite mental capacity is found lacking.
13. Adams v. State, 8 Md. App. at 688-89, 262 A.2d at 72; Prevatte v. Director, 5
Md. App. at 412, 248 A.2d at 174.
14. For examples of the cruel punishment that has been meted out to children, see
R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 838 (2d ed. 1969).
15. Among the express purposes of the act was to "remove from children committing
delinquent acts the taint of criminality and the consequences of criminal behavior, and
to substitute therefor a program of treatment, training and rehabilitation consistent with
the protection of the public interest .... ." MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70(2) (1973),
recodified in Cts. & Jud. Proc. art., §§ 3-802(a)(2) and (3) (1974).
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criminal nor punitive in nature.'" Under the statute, the court's
function is to determine whether there is a basis for a finding of
delinquency in the form of a delinquent act and whether the child
also requires supervision, treatment, or rehabilitation.' 7
Ostensibly, the advent of the delinquency statutes ended the
need for the common law blanket exculpation of children. The
dispositions of the juvenile court are designed to be clinical and
rehabilitative. Logically, then, where a court does not attach
criminal penalties, but instead "treats" and "supervises" the
child, the protection of presumptive incapacity is no longer relevant. That presumption "was designed to restrict the punishment
of children and should not be used where no question of punishment arises."' 8
Given this framework, the court's conclusion that the state
need not rebut presumptions of criminal incapacity seems compelled by both the purpose and the logic behind the existence of
the juvenile statute. Judge Orth, writing for the court in Davis,
found the Maryland statutory scheme to comprehend this purpose:
It being clear that the finding in a juvenile proceeding
that a child is delinquent is not the equivalent of a determination arrived at in a criminal proceeding that he has committed a crime, it follows that it is not a prerequisite to a
finding that a person is a delinquent child that the State
show under the common law rule that the child had such
maturity in fact as to have a guilty knowledge that he was
doing wrong, that is the capacity to commit crime.'"
The court's statement might be read as holding only that the
state need not affirmatively prove capacity. The statement does
not preclude the availability of the defense of infancy to the juvenile. The opinion later makes it clear, however, that the term
"delinquent act" does not include the capacity element since
"the child under the jurisdiction of a juvenile court is conclusively
presumed doli incapax."20 Therefore, any discussion of criminal
16. See In re Hamill, 10 Md. App. 586, 590-91, 271 A.2d 762, 764-65 (1970).
17. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, 70-1(h) (1973), recodified in Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3801(k) (1974), defines a delinquent child as one "who commits a delinquent act and who
requires supervision, treatment, or rehabilitation."
18. Williams, Criminal Responsibility of Children, 1954 CRIM. L. REV. 493, 496.
Williams suggests further that to find a child guilty without showing that he knew that
his conduct was wrong is both practicable and consistent with legislative policy where the
"sole purpose is to impose reformative treatment." Id.
19. 17 Md. App. at 103-04, 299 A.2d at 860 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 104, 299 A.2d at 860.
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capacity would be irrelevant in juvenile proceedings, except insofar as it illuminates the need for reformative treatment.
However, the non-criminal nature of the juvenile proceedings
does not necessarily eliminate the requirement of proof of capacity. The jurisdictional basis of delinquency still rests (in part) on
"an act which would be a crime if done by a person who is not a
child." 2 ' Since criminal capacity (or mens rea of legal responsibility) is an element of such a crime (even though it would be presumed to exist in an adult), arguably the state must show that
the child possessed it. This conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court of California in In re R. ,2 where the California code
provision gave juvenile court jurisdiction over any minor who
violates "any law of this state." The court held that the state
must show by clear proof23 that a minor under 14 at the time of
the act had criminal capacity.
This conclusion follows from the statutory postulate that the
jurisdiction of the court must rest upon a violation of a law
that defines crime and from the further statutory requirement of [the California] Penal Code . . . that, by definition, a child under the age of 14 years does not commit a
crime in the
absence of clear proof that he "knew its wrong'24
fulness.
A strict reading of the express California law, then, forces the
conclusion that the capacity requirement has been left intact.
The Maryland statute, though, basing juvenile jurisdiction
on an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult,
rather than on "a violation of a law that defines crime," would
generate a different result. When an adult commits a crime, capacity presumptively exists. The Maryland law could then be
read as presuming capacity in the juvenile offender and shifting
the burden to the child to prove that he lacked it. The logical
development, however, proceeds further. If a crime was committed by an adult there would not be available a defense of incapacity based on infancy, since that defense is limited by common law
21. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-1(g) (1973), recodified in Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art.,
§ 3-801(j) (1974).
22. 1 Cal. 3d 855, 464 P.2d 127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1970).
23. In light of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), which held that due process
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile hearings, California now requires
such a standard instead of "clear proof." In re C.D.H., 7 Cal. App. 3d 230, 86 Cal. Rptr.
565 (1970). Maryland also requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. MD.ANN. CODE art.
26, § 70-18(a) (1973), recodified in Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-830(a) (1974).
24. 1 Cal. 3d at 862, 464 P.2d at 132-33, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 676-77.
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definition to those under fourteen. Therefore, the statute on its
face seems to have excluded that defense in the juvenile court,
although it leaves other capacity defenses, such as insanity or
drunkenness, applicable.
The Davis opinion, however, did not use this analysis, and
it concluded that any discussion of capacity is inapplicable. The
case may therefore be in conflict with the express statutory provisions. Davis may more easily be reconciled with the juvenile statute if it rests upon the premise that the common law requirement
of capacity has been impliedly abolished. As Davis hints, a defense of incapacity would be repugnant to the principles and
purposes of the juvenile statute. One authority has noted:
[Wihen the purpose of treatment of immature offenders is
solely rehabilitation, it is unnecessary to set limits of absolute irresponsibility. The same is true of conditional responsibility. Age lines and rebuttable presumptions of incapacity
become superfluous in the light of this treatment purpose.
Indeed if all offenders should be treated by the criminal law
like patients by a physician, the concept of criminal responsibility would vanish . . . . The problem of responsibility
can exist only in connection with treatment for the sake of

deterrence .25
The survival of the incapacity defense would nullify much of the
juvenile statute's effectiveness since such a defense would prevent reformation of children who successfully argue it. Arguably,
then, the defense has been abolished by implication. 6 This con25. Ludwig, Responsibility for Young Offenders, 29 NEB. L. REv. 521, 534 (1950).
26. See United States v. Borders, 154 F. Supp. 214, 217 (N.D. Ala. 1957), aff'd, 256
F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1958) (stating that a requirement of proof of criminal capacity would
frustrate the purposes of the Federal Delinquency Act); Juvenile Court v. State, 139 Tenn.
549, 201 S.W. 771 (1918) (stating that "incapacity" applies to criminal proceedings and
that juvenile courts are not criminal); In re R., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 874, 464 P.2d 127, 140, 83
Cal. Rptr. 671, 684 (1970) (concurring and dissenting opinion) (arguing that proof of
criminal capacity or "knowledge of wrongfulness" is in conflict with the purpose and
function of the juvenile statute and that section of criminal code requiring such proof
before adjudication is inapplicable to juvenile proceedings). But see In re R., 1 Cal. 3d at
863, 464 P.2d at 133, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 677, (where the majority held that a requirement of
criminal capacity was not changed by implication, nor was it inconsistent with or repugnant to the principles of juvenile delinquency legislation).
Arguments supporting the result in In re R., as consistent with juvenile legislation
goals were presented in Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv.
659, 672-74 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Fox]. After assuming that alternative juvenile
jurisdiction would be available over a child dismissed from delinquency jurisdiction because of lack of capacity, the author offered several reasons why it would be preferable
for alternative jurisdiction to be exercised. It is suggested, for example, that where a
juvenile must first be condemned as having committed criminal acts he may perceive
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clusion, however, contradicts the general rule that in construing
statutes the courts presume that the legislature meant no change
in the common law beyond that which it has plainly and expressly announced."? Since the juvenile statute has not expressly
eliminated the capacity requirement, the statute should be
amended to declare that a finding of criminal capacity is not
required in an adjudication of delinquency.
The second category of mens rea, which concerns criminal
incapacity, is irrevelant to the juvenile proceedings. However,
special mens rea, which is the particular intent requirement provided by the definition of the crime, has not been eliminated, and
it must be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
Two considerations support the conclusion that special mens rea
is an element of the delinquency act. First, no effective disposition of a juvenile case, consistent with the statute's announced
purposes, can be made unless the special mens rea is shown to
exist. For example, without first determining whether a child
knowingly possessed stolen goods, or whether his conduct was
accidental or volitional, a judge cannot determine the kind of, or
the need for, supervision, treatment, or rehabilitation." A finding
hypocrisy in the offer of help that follows. If jurisdiction is maintained initially on other
grounds (in Maryland possible alternative grounds would be juvenile jurisdiction over
neglected children, children in need of supervision, or mentally handicapped children),
the proceedings might be better suited to help "the grossly immature child who commits
a crime on the basis of his immaturity rather than as a consequence of his criminal
Id.
I..."
at 672.
behavior .
27. E.g., Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354, 356 (1934), quoting with approval
25 R.C.L. 1054:
It has been said that statutes are not presumed to make any alterations in the
common law further than is expressly declared, and that a statute, made in the
affirmative without any negative expressed or implied, does not take away the
common law. The rules of the common law are not to be changed by doubtful
implication, nor overturned except by clear and unambiguous language. In order
to hold that a statute has abrogated common law rights existing at the date of its
enactment, it must clearly appear that they are repugnant to the act, or the part
thereof invoked, that their survival would in effect deprive it of its efficacy and
render its provisions nugatory.
28. Cf. In re Winburn, 32 Wis. 2d 152, 163-64, 145 N.W.2d 178, 184 (1966), saying:
"We think it would be conceded that juvenile delinquency should not lie where the child's
act is purely an accident. As Holmes put it, 'even a dog distinguishes between being
stumbled over and being kicked.' "The need for a finding of specific intent was made clear
in In re Glassberg, 230 La. 396, 88 So.2d 707 (1956), where a juvenile who had shot his
playmate was found delinquent by the lower court for having committed aggravated
battery. Such a crime under Louisiana law requires the presence of general criminal intent
(special mens rea), which is a voluntary act likely to result, in the course of ordinary
human experience, in certain consequences. In light of defendant's denial that he aimed
the gun or that he pulled the trigger and his assertion that the gun fired accidentally, the
court reversed judgment. It reasoned that no intelligent disposition could be made until
the special mens rea element was proved. Proof distinguishing his act from negligent

1974

INCAPACITY OF MINORS

of special mens rea becomes most important where, as in possession of stolen goods, the mental element is the essence of the
crime itself.29 Second, since the Maryland delinquency statute
bases jurisdiction (in part) on an act "which would be a crime if
done by a person who is not a child," it dictates that the prosecution prove the requisite special mens rea, since without such proof
most acts would not constitute a crime if committed by an
adult.3" Unlike criminal capacity, no factors suggest that a special
injury, "a crime of far less magnitude," id. at -, 88 So.2d at 711, was needed.
The conclusion that "mens rea should be viewed as an objective criteria which must
be satisfied before a violation of certain statutory or common law offenses is shown" was
reached in Westbrook, Mens rea in the Juvenile Court, 5 J. FAM. LAW 121, 138 (1965). It
is not clear, however, whether criminal capacity, in addition to special mens rea, was
viewed by the author as part of the criteria.
29. See In re Unsworth, 276 So.2d 337 (La. App. 1973) (where adjudication of delinquency for receiving stolen goods was reversed because of the state's failure to prove that
the juvenile knew goods were stolen); State v. Melanson, 259 So.2d 609, 613 (La. App.
1972), stating, "The above finding [that the youth intentionally received stolen items]
is the essence of the crime of possession of stolen goods, and the absence of any evidence
of Washington's criminal intent or knowledge renders his adjudication as a delinquent
reversible error" [footnote omitted].
30. Accord, In re Mei, 122 N.J. Eq. 125, 129, 192 A. 80, 83 (1937) (dictum) (overruled
by State v. Monahan, 15 N.J. 34, 42, 104 A.2d 21, 33 (1954)) stating that:
For a juvenile court judge to find a lad guilty of delinquency in that he has committed an act which, if done by one above the age of sixteen years, would be murder,
he must, of course, adjudge, in effect, that the lad has combined all of the factors
of that awful crime and is saved from prosecution and presumably from conviction
only by his age. Amongst the incidents to such a finding is that of the presence of
criminal intent, for otherwise the act would not, in a person of any age, be murder.
But cf., In re H.C., 106 N.J. Super, 583, 595, 256 A.2d 322, 328 (1969), claiming that the
"inquiry is and must be, 'Was the act committed?'" If the court's statement is read as
intending to eliminate the need for examining the special mens rea where a petition is
based on a criminal violation, then it cannot be reconciled with either In re Mei or New
Jersey's strict statutory terms. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:4-14 (Supp. 1973-74) defining
juvenile delinquency (in part) as:
[tihe commission by a child under 18 years of age
(1) of any act which when committed by a person of the age of 18 years or over
would constitute:
(a) A felony, high misdemeanor, a misdemeanor, or other offense . ..
Since, under the statute, to provide the basis for delinquency an act must constitute a
crime if done by an adult, the inquiry should be "Was the act, including the requisite
special mens rea, which together define the crime, committed?"
The same statutory objections can be found to the enigmatic statement in State v.
Monahan, 15 N.J. 34, 56, 104 A.2d 21, 33 (1954) (concurringopinion): "Intent would seem
to be an ingredient of juvenile delinquency also; but it is not criminal intent, penal rather
than correctional in its consequences when the wrongful act occurs." Although the nature
of this (civil ?) intent is unclear, it seemingly does not refer to mens rea of legal responsibility since the opinion earlier admits that criminal capacity is not an element of juvenile
delinquency. If it refers to the special mens rea, then calling it "penal" or "correctional"
is irrelevant since it would still have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See N.J.
CT. R. 5:9-1(f) (1973) (requiring that evidence supporting an adjudication of delinquency
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt).
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mens rea requirement would be inconsistent with juvenile legislation.
One weakness of the Davis decision is that its conclusion
concerning criminal capacity is grounded in the theory that juvenile proceedings are non-criminal. Once it is admitted that juvenile proceedings fail to achieve their ideals and do indeed involve
punishment,3 then the rationale for denying the infant his common law defenses to punishment for his acts begins to disappear.
In addition to the defense of infancy, the Davis decision would
logically extend to denying juveniles the defense of insanity.
Since insanity is used to rebut the presumption of criminal capacity (mens rea of legal responsibility),32 its application should not
extend to juvenile proceedings where the lack of such capacity
does not bar adjudication. In Wisconsin, the highest court pierced
the announced, noble motives of juvenile legislation to take into
account the practical everyday consequences of its operation and
concluded that principles of due process and fair treatment compel consideration of an insanity defense.33 In Maryland, where
juvenile justice similarly does not approach the ideal,34 the Davis
decision should not be extended to deny the child a defense of
insanity. Alternative jurisdiction in such cases should be based
See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966), observing:
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of juvenile courts,
studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to whether actual
performance measures well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable
the immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional guarantees applicable
to adults [footnote omitted].
32. See Bradford v. State, 234 Md. 505, 510, 200 A.2d. 150, 153 (1964).
33. See In re Winburn, 32 Wis. 2d 152, 161, 145 N.W.2d 178, 182 (1966). After citing
the Wisconsin Juvenile Statute for its laudable purposes and several of its protective
provisions, the court went on to examine the real effects of an adjudication of delinquency.
It concluded, "Irrespective of what we call the juvenile procedure, and no matter how
benign and well intended the judge who administers the system, the juvenile procedures,
to some degree at least, smack of 'crime and punishments' . . . . Retribution, in practice,
plays a role in the function of the juvenile court." The court then held that "the defense
of insanity must be permitted in a juvenile delinquency procedure if those proceedings
are to conform to the minimum Kent standards of due process and fair treatment . ...
A petition based requires criminal intent cannot result in a violation that a finding
of delinquency when the conduct was either unintended or when, because of insanity,
there was a failure to form the requisite intent." 32 Wis. 2d at 165, 145 N.W.2d at 184.
Contra, In re H.C., 106 N.J. Super. 583, 595, 256 A.2d 322, 328 (1969), saying: "To hold
insanity applicable as a defense to adjudication would handcuff thq court, run contrary
to the basic theory of juvenile proceedings, and not be in the best interests of the juvenile
himself."
34. See Moylan, Comments on the Juvenile Court, 25 MD. L. REv. 310 (1965).
31.
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on "children alleged to be mentally handicapped ' 31 where the
child's problems may be attended without the inexorable criminal overtones of the delinquency process.

FIRST AMENDMENT-FREEDOM OF

SPEECH-SCHOOL OFFI-

CIALS CANNOT DISCIPLINE STUDENTS WHO REFUSE BY WORD OR ACT

TO SHOW RESPECT TO THE

FLAG-Goetz v. Ansell'

Because the plaintiff Theodore Goetz, a senior high school
honor student and president of his class, believed there was not
"liberty and justice for all" in the United States, he refused, at
the risk of suspension, to participate in the Pledge of Allegiance
or to abide by the school's decision that he should stand quietly
or leave the classroom while the pledge was being recited. Accordingly, the plaintiff sued in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of New York for an injunction, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983,2 in which he asserted a first
amendment right to express his beliefs without stigmatization or
punishment by remaining quietly seated during the pledge. The
district court dismissed the action.3 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, disregarding the lower court's finding that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applied to the
plaintiff's case,4 determined on the merits that, since the plaintiff
35. See Fox, supra note 26, at 680-82 (suggesting that the insane juvenile should be
treated outside the delinquency process in order to conform more closely with reformative
juvenile statute goals).
1. 477 F.2d 636 (2nd Cir. 1973). For facts and arguments not in the appellate court
opinion, see Goetz v. Ansell, No. 72-CV-552 (N.D.N.Y., Jan. 31, 1973).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), entitled "Civil action for deprivation of rights," provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
The plaintiff filed the suit to enjoin disciplinary action and to expunge school records
against the President of the Board of Education, the Superintendent of Schools, the
Principal of the high school, both individually and in their official capacities, and against
the Board of Education.
3. The district court held that the plaintiff had not exhausted the appropriate administrative remedies. See note 4 infra. In addition, the lower court believed that the
"stand silently" or "leave the room" option was sufficient to accommodate plaintiff's first
amendment rights. No. 72-CV-552 at 9.
4. Judge Feinberg stated: "Putting to one side the question whether the doctrine of
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could not be compelled to salute the flag and to recite the pledge, 5
exhaustion of administrative remedies still applies in a section 1983 suit, invoking it on
these facts was clearly unwarranted." 477 F.2d at 637 (footnote omitted). Resort to the
Board of Education would be "certainly or probably futile," noted the court, citing Eisen
v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 569 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970) which states
that plaintiff must exhaust the state remedy if that remedy is not futile and not inadequate; the Board of Education had held against plaintiffs older brother on the precise
point only a year earlier. 477 F.2d at 637. In addition, the New York State Commissioner
of Education had held in 1970 that requiring a student to stand silently or leave the room
was not an infringement of the student's rights. In re Bielenberg, 9 Ed. Dept. Rep. 196
(1970). In 1971 the Commissioner approved the former decision. In Re Bustin, 10 Ed.
Dept. Rep. 168, 169 (1971). Subsequent guidelines reiterated the policy. Therefore, the
court concluded that "there was no real remedy to exhaust", 477 F.2d at 637 (footnote
omitted), by the plaintiff's following of N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 310 (McKinney 1969) which
permits "[ainy person conceiving himself aggrieved" by the act of a school official to
appeal to the New York State Commissioner of Education.
The district court, in dismissing the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, emphasized that the "stand silently" or "leave the room" position was not
entrenched into the school system by repeated rulings. The Commissioner had only spoken
once, two and one-half years previously, on the question. The Board of Education also had
only ruled once, one year previously, to which ruling there was no appeal. The guidelines
were advisory rather than mandatory. In addition, because the basic state regulations
providing for the pledge lack guidance and because administrators are unpredictable, the
rule might change on administrative appeal. (However, neither the appellate court nor
the district court mentioned that the statute providing for the appeal procedure was
discretionary rather than mandatory.) Moreover, the district court posited that school
administrators should be able to exercise their judgment prior to the federal court's interfering with the daily administration of the public schools in light of the judicial recognition
that public education is to be controlled by state and local authorities. No. 72-CV-552 at
6-8.
The more general question of whether exhaustion of administrative remedies applies
to section 1983 cases has caused considerable debate. In response to the Goetz court's
failure to discuss the problem, Judge Smith in a concurring opinion stated that he did
...not share in any possible implied doubt that any requirement of exhaustion of
administrative remedies in § 1983 cases has survived Wilwording v. Swenson, 404
U.S. 249 (1971) (per curiam) [Since the remedy provided by the Civil Rights Act
is supplemental to any state remedy, there is no need for plaintiffs who assert a
claim under section 1983 to exhaust state remedies before entering the federal
courts.].
With regard to this problem, Henry J. Friendly, Chief Judge of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, has stated:
It is clear that the Supreme Court has not sanctioned any general requirement of
exhaustion of state judicial remedies as a prelude to federal suits for damages or
for injunctive or declaratory relief against unconstitutional state action. Until recently it was equally clear that exhaustion of state administrative remedies was
required; I have undertaken to show in an opinion that this is still the law except
when the administrative remedy is inadequate or resort to it is certainly or probably
futile. There is no justification for leaving the matter in doubt. Congress should
provide that a federal court faced with a challenge to the constitutionality of state
action, whether under the Civil Rights Act or otherwise, may abstain pending
exhaustion of state administrative remedies and shall do so whenever these remedies are plain, adequate and effective . . ..
H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 100-01 (1973). But cf. Shakman,
Book Review, 33 MD.L. REv. 527, 532-33 (1973).
5. 477 F.2d at 637, citing West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943).
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he could not be made to give other gestures of acceptance, such
as standing.' Further, the plaintiff could not be punished for his
non-participation by being made to leave the classroom. 7 Consequently, he could remain quietly seated during the pledge. 8
In light of this nation's recent political turmoil, involvement
in Vietnam, civil rights movements and other conscience provoking events, it is not surprising that the question of whether a
student can protest governmental actions by refusing to participate in a flag salute ceremony arose. During troubled times disputes concerning patriotism and loyalty emerge. Authorities believe that the country needs a public display of national unity and
strength. Certain individual citizens, however, refuse to have
their basic constitutional rights impinged upon by various required actions denoting loyalty. Because the flag has become a
symbol of the United States as a nation' and "a symbol of adherence to government as presently organized,"'' around it have developed many of the conflicts between freedom and authority."
The specific controversy frequently centers upon the often
6. 477 F.2d at 638, citing New York State Regulations which provide: "In giving the
pledge to the flag, the procedure is to render the pledge by standing with the right hand
over the heart." 8 CRRNY § 108.5 (b) (emphasis added). Banks v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285, 296 (S.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd mem., 450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971)
(standing "is no less a gesture of acceptance and respect than is the salute or the utterance
of the words of allegiance.").
7. 477 F.2d at 638 citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) in
which the Supreme Court held that no religious exercises, such as prayers, may be required even if individual students could be excused from attending or participating in
such exercises. Justice Clark stated in Abington that the right to be excused is not a
defense to a claim of unconstitutionality. The Goetz court, however, emphasized Justice
Brennan's view that "'the excluded pupil loses caste with his fellows and is liable to be
regarded with aversion, and subjected to reproach and insult.'" (374 U.S. at 292
[Brennan, J., concurring, quoting from State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd. of School Dist.
No. 8, 76 Wis. 177, 200, 44 N.W. 967, 975 (1890)]). 477 F.2d at 638.
8. "Silent, non-disruptive expression of belief by sitting down may [not] . . .be
prohibited." 477 F.2d at 638. Query whether the rule would apply to teachers. Cf. Russo
v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972).
The appellate court did not discuss the preliminary injunction procedures in its
opinion. It merely ruled that there was no remedy to exhaust and that plaintiff won on
the merits. It is, therefore, not clear whether the court meant to grant a preliminary
injunction only or a permanent injunction for the students as a class. The district court
opinion does contain a recitation of the elements necessary for a preliminary injunction
decree. No. 72-CV-552 at 9.
9. "Its colors, its stripes, and its stars represent our country and all that it is, its
history and accomplishments, its hopes and aspirations." Banks v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285, 296 (S.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd mem., 450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971).
10. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943).
11. D. MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR (1962) (analyzes the reaction to the
Gobitis decision [see notes 15 and 16 infra and accompanying text] and researches the
entire flag salute controversy).
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compulsory recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.' Originally
conceived in 1892 as a voluntary and recommended patriotic exercise for the quadricentennial celebration of Columbus Day, the
pledge first became an obligatory requirement, in New York, in
1898, one day after the commencement of the Spanish-American
War. 3 During World War I Maryland made the pledge a compulsory schoolroom exercise. 4 By the outbreak of World War II,
many states or local boards of education had instituted the pledge
and the flag salute as a required exercise; the exercise is still
required in many states.
Most of the early disputes involving the flag salute and
pledge concerned a religious sect, the Jehovah's Witnesses.' 5 Because of their literal interpretation of the Bible,"' the Witnesses
refused to salute the flag and sought to enjoin authorities from
making participation in the flag salute ceremony a condition of
12. In this Recent Decision, Pledge of Allegiance and flag salute are used synonymously. Controversy also arises with respect to violations of flag desecration statutes. See
Comment, Exploiting the American Flag: Can the Law Distinguish Criminal From
Patriot?,30 MD. L. REv. 332 (1970). The Maryland enactment, which is found at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27 §§ 81-87 (1971) (entitled the Uniform Flag Law) states at section 83: "No
person shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, defy, trample upon, or by word or act cast
contempt upon any such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield." Query whether plaintiff's
actions would have been in violation of the Maryland statute. It should be noted that the
plaintiff in Goetz was not prosecuted under a similarly worded New York statute. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 1425 (16)(d) (McKinney 1967). See note 23 infra wherein it is implied that
plaintiff's actions would not have violated this type of statute.
13. State v. Lundquist, 262 Md. 534, 537-38, 278 A.2d 263, 265 (1971). The present
New York educational requirement is found at N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 802 (McKinney 1969).
Supplemental requirements are promulgated by the Commissioner of Education and the
various Boards of Education in New York. See Goetz v. Ansell, No. 72-CV-522 at 5-6
(N.D.N.Y., Jan. 31, 1973).
14. Act of April 10, 1918, ch. 75, § 176-a, [1918] Md. Laws 121. See WEIG AND
APPLEMAN, THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FLAG (1961) (passim).
15. Therefore, both freedom of speech and freedom of religion were argued to the
courts. The main cases concerning Jehovah's Witnesses to be considered are Minersville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (see notes 17 and 18 infra and accompanying
text) and West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (see notes 19,
20 and 21, infra, and accompanying text). See also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943) (holding that the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of press and religion
prevents a state from imposing a peddler's license tax upon the Jehovah's Witnesses'
canvassing from door-to-door); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (invalidating an
ordinance making unlawful the distribution of handbills and other literature from doorto-door because it is in conflict with freedom of speech and press); Douglas v. Jeannette,
319 U.S. 157 (1943).
16. The Witnesses refused to salute the flag, because they considered the flag an
image under Exodus 20:4-5 which states:
Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that
is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under
the earth; thou shalt not bow thyself to them nor serve them.
See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 629 (1943).

1974

PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE

their children's attendance in public school. In Minersville School
District v. Gobitis7 the Supreme Court decided that state legislatures have the power to impose the flag salute discipline upon
school children and to provide for the expulsion of children who
refuse to accede to the requirement. "National unity is the basis
of national security," and the authorities have "the right to select
appropriate means for its attainment."' 8
However, three years later in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette"9-another case instituted by the Jehovah's Witnesses to enjoin compulsory flag ceremonies-the Supreme Court overruled Gobitis and held that the first amendment's freedom of speech clause and the fourteenth amendment
require that school children must not be forced to salute and to
recite the Pledge of Allegiance. Justice Jackson eloquently stated:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an
exception, they do not now occur to us.
We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the
flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations
on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.'
Since Justice Jackson's opinion was joined by only two other
justices2 ' and the case involved Jehovah's Witnesses, some reasoned that Barnette was decided solely on religious grounds. For
example, in rewriting a law requiring all students and teachers to
stand, to salute the flag and to recite in unison the Pledge of
Allegiance, Maryland provided that "[a]ny pupile or teacher, for
17. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
18. Id. at 595.
19. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See Note, ConstitutionalImplications of Compulsory Flag
Salute Statutes, 12 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 70 (1943-44).
20. 319 U.S. at 642.
21. Justice Jackson was joined by Chief Justice Stone and Justice Rutledge. Justices
Black and Douglas in a concurring opinion stated that they were "substantially in agreement with the opinion just read," 319 U.S. at 643, but they wanted to discuss their change
of view, since they both joined in the majority opinion of Gobitis. The discussion focused
on freedom of religion. Justice Murphy wrote a separate concurring opinion which began,
"I agree with the opinion of the Court and join in it." Id. at 644. He then discussed the
religious issues in greater depth. Justices Roberts and Reed together and Frankfurter in a
separate opinion dissented.
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religious reasons, may be excused from actually repeating the
words of the Pledge of Allegiance and from giving any form of
hand salute. ' 22 Later decisions, however, emphasized that
Barnette was decided primarily on freedom of speech grounds.
The Supreme Court recently stated, "In . . .Barnette . . . this
court held that to require unwilling school children to salute the
flag would violate rights of free expression assured by the Fourteenth Amendment."2 Also, in State v. Lundquist,4 wherein the
pledge and punishment provisions of the Maryland flag salute
statute were held to be unenforceable by school officials because
they abridged freedom of speech, the Maryland Court of Appeals
stated: "In our view Barnette was unequivocally decided as a
question of free speech under the First Amendment; it is binding
'2
as such on this Court. 5
Thus, since Barnette, it has been unconstitutional as a violation of free speech for the state to compel students to pledge
allegiance to the flag as a condition of attending school. Recently,
however, cases involving students have changed their focus
slightly; they have concerned the right of the student to refuse to
follow certain educational pronouncements, such refusal being an
exercise of first amendment rights. For example, in Tinker v. Des
2" the Supreme
Moines Independent Community School District,
Court held that, because the wearing of black armbands, to protest the Vietnam War, was akin to free speech, school regulations
prohibiting students from wearing armbands were unconstitu22.

Ch. 737, [19701 Md. Laws 2062 (emphasis added). The Act is codified in MD.

ANN. CODE art. 77, § 77 (Supp. 1973).

23. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 593 (1969) (emphasis added) (Because the
Constitution tolerates and protects freedom of expression, a New York statute permitting
plaintiff to be punished for merely speaking defiant or contemptuous words about the
American flag-"If they did that (killed) Meredith, we don't need an American
Flag"-was held to be unconstitutional.). See note 12 supra.
24. 262 Md. 534, 278 A.2d 263 (1971).
25. Id. at 552, 278 A.2d at 273. See note 22 supra. The Maryland Court of Appeals
in Lundquist also stated: "Justice Jackson addressed a more fundamental issue than that
posed by the religiously motivated plaintiffs or framed by the Gobitis opinion." Id. at 547,
278 A.2d at 270. This conclusion was drawn by the Maryland Court of Appeals, id. at 547,
278 A.2d at 270-71, from Justice Jackson's language in Barnette:
Nor does the issue as we see it turn on one's possession of particular religious views
or the sincerity with which they are held. While religion supplies appellees' motive
for enduring the discomforts of making the issue in this case, many citizens who
do not share those religious views hold such a compulsory rite to infringe constitutional liberty of the individual. It is not necessary to inquire whether nonconformist beliefs will exempt from the duty to salute unless we first find power to
make the salute a legal duty.
319 U.S. at 634-35.
26. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REv. 154
(1969).
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tional. Noting that students do not shed their constitutional
rights when they enter the school-house gate, the Court ruled that
students are free to exhibit their disapproval of governmental
actions at school as long as the orderly functioning of the school
is not disrupted. Only if the school board can show that the form
of protest would substantially interfere with the work of the
school or would impinge upon the rights of other students,27 can
the school officials prohibit the conduct.
Seemingly, the first amendment right under Tinker to refuse
recitation of the pledge as a form of expression, rather than the
students' right under Barnette to be free of any compulsion to
express affirmatively a standard code of beliefs, would appear to
be the most obvious rationale for a Goetz situation. In fact, while
the Second Circuit in Goetz did not view the plaintiff's refusal to
stand or to leave the room during the recitation of the pledge as
a form of protest which Tinker protected on first amendment
grounds, most of the similar flag salute cases have applied this
5 the court in
reasoning. In Banks v. Board of Public Instruction"
light of Tinker voided a School Board Policy-Regulation requiring
a student, who for religious or other reasons does not participate
in the pledge or salute, to stand during the pledge. The first
amendment protects the right to differ and to express opinions,
even if those opinions are unfounded and even to the extent that
27. With regard to the form of the symbolic acts of expressions of protest, the Court
in Tinker stated:
The District court concluded that the action of the school authorities was
reasonable because it was based upon their fear of a disturbance from the wearing
of the armbands. But, in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression ....
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a
particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused
by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding
and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would "materially and
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school," the prohibition cannot be sustained.
393 U.S. at 508-09.
The district court in Goetz believed that Tinker involved only discussion outside the
classroom and that there is, therefore, no absolute right to use all parts of the school
building, especially the classroom, as a forum for freedom of expression. No. 72-CV-552
at 9. However, a close reading of the Tinker opinion reveals that the Court assumed there
could be expression in the classroom and was only troubled by extending the right to
expression outside the classroom:
A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he
is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized
hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects. . ..
393 U.S. at 512-13.
28. 314 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd mem., 450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971).
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those opinions exhibit disrespect toward the flag and the country.
In Frain v. Baron," another New York case, the court citing
Tinker implied that students, who did not believe there was liberty and justice in the United States and thereby did not recite
the pledge, could not be made to leave the classroom during the
ceremony. Silent expression in the classroom cannot be forbidden
in the absence of disruption, noted the court in Frain.In contrast,
the court in Goetz did not rely upon the Tinker rationale. The
court merely cited Tinker to reject the defense that plaintiff's
actions disrupted classwork or impinged on the rights of others.
In relying primarily on Barnette to allow plaintiff to remain
silently seated in the classroom during the pledge, Goetz read
3
more into Barnette than other courts have been wont to do. 0
Normally, Barnette is used as precedent merely for the proposition that a state cannot compel student participation in the
pledge. Tinker on the other hand is cited as precedent for the
proposition that a student has a first amendment right to protest
governmental actions by remaining in the classroom quietly
seated while the pledge is being recited. For example, in Banks
v. Board of Public Instruction" the court stated:
Without more Barnette would be dispositive of this matter
[of Andrew Banks' refusal to stand quietly during the flag
salute ceremony] for Andrew Banks was suspended for his
refusal to act in accordance with a regulation, the operation
of which prevented him from exercising his First Amendment rights. Yet, the tenor of Barnette is negative. It prohibits the state from compelling individuals to act in a certain
manner; it is not a recognition of students' rights. On the
other hand, the Supreme Court's decision in Tinker . . .
speaks affirmatively.
The conduct of Andrew Banks in refusing to stand during the
pledge ceremony constituted an expression of his religious
beliefs and political opinions. His refusal to stand was no less
29. 307 F. Supp. 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (grant of preliminary injunction justified since
plaintiffs have a strong possibility of success on the merits). In Frain the court explicitly
stated that Tinker was applicable to flag salute cases: "While Tinker did not involve a
refusal to participate in patriotic exercises in school, the Supreme Court did not tie its
opinion to a particular set of facts, but enunciated a rule of general applicability." Id. at
31.
30. This primary reliance and the fact that the court discusses Barnette in detail
could, however, be attributed to the defendants' apparent concession that students have
a protected first amendment right not to participate in the pledge. 477 F.2d at 638.
31. 314 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd. mem., 450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971).
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a form of expression than the wearing of the black armband
was to Mary Beth
Tinker. He was exercising a right "akin
32
to pure speech.
Concerning the question of exclusion, because Goetz
emphasized Barnette rather than Tinker, the Goetz court had to
cite Abington School District v. Schempp l as the basis for holding that a student could not be punished by being excluded from
the classroom. This raises a problem because Abington
specifically dealt with prayer in the schools, which violates the
first amendment's prohibition against the establishment of any
religion. Apparently no other case beside Goetz has extended the
punishment-by-exclusion language to flag salute cases.34 However, the reason that such an extension is normally unnecessary
today is that Tinker views exclusion from the classroom as an
infringement upon the first amendment right of free speech. Only
when Barnette is relied upon by a court, as it was in Goetz, is the
punishment language required, since again Barnette only prohibits a state from compelling action and does not directly recognize
students' rights. Although prayer in school is attacked on different constitutional grounds than is the pledge, Brennan's
statement in Abington that exclusion is punishment because it
causes loss of respect from peers and because it subjects the excluded to aversion would apply as validly to exclusion during the
Pledge of Allegiance as to exclusion during a compulsory prayer.
There has been no case in Maryland which has had to decide
the question of whether a student who did not wish to participate
in the flag salute ceremony could be made to stand or otherwise
be excluded from the classroom. Nevertheless, the Maryland
courts would undoubtedly reach the same result as that in Goetz.
This is evident from the language in Lundquist:
32. 314 F. Supp. at 295. See also Frain v. Baron, 307 F. Supp. 27, 30-31 (1969), which
states:
The original concern with limitation of the state's power to compel a student to act
contrary to his beliefs has shifted to a concern for affirmative protection of the
student's right to express his beliefs. The present case is novel in that the context,
school patriotic exercises, is one in which courts have previously intervened to limit
coerced participation, while these plaintiffs are arguing not only a right of nonparticipation but a right of silent protest by remaining seated.
33. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
34. The only other cases which state that exclusion from the classroom is a form of
punishment are cases involving prayer. See, e.g., People v. Board of Educ. of Dist. 24, 245
11. 334, 351, 92 N.E. 251, 256 (1910); Herold v. ParishBd. of School Directors, 136 La.
1034, 1049-50, 68 So. 116, 121 (1915); Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 48-52, 100 A.2d
857, 867-868 (1953); State v. DistrictBd. of School Dist. No. 8, 76 Wis. 177, 200, 44 N.W.
967, 975 (1890).
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[W]e are far from convinced that. the mere refusal to participate in any phase of the pledge of allegiance ritual is punishable. To reach a contrary conclusion would allow the schools
to discipline such refusal as "an act of disrespect," even
though they may not compel this ceremony in the first
place.3 5
While Goetz does not really expand the law in this area, it is
nevertheless significant. The decision evolved by a slightly different reasoning process. The Court primarily relied on Barnette's
language that a state cannot force participation rather than upon
Tinker's right-to-protest language. Most importantly, Goetz is
the first United States Court of Appeals case subsequent to
Tinker to put forward a definitive statement that students do not
have to participate in the flag salute ceremony in any form and
cannot be excluded from the classroom because of nonparticipation ."
35. 262 Md. at 554, 278 A.2d at 274 (emphasis added). However, Lundquist did note
that there is "ample authority [in Tinker] to punish students or teachers who materially
Id. The
disrupt proper school activities, including voluntary patriotic programs ....
problem may, however, never arise since Lundquist held the pledge requirement
unenforceable.
36. Where the student's actions cause disruptions the conduct may not be protected,
but the onus is on the school authorities to show that the student's conduct has materially
and substantially disrupted the operations of the classroom. Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636,
638 (2d Cir. 1973); Frain v. Baron, 307 F. Supp. 27, 31-32 (1969) citing Tinker as authority.

